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ABSTRACT
POLITICAL COMMUNITY AND INDIVIDUAL GAIN-
ARISTOTLE, ADAM SMITH AND THE PROBLEM OF EXCHANGE
SEPTEMBER 2002
KIMBERLY K. SIMS, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
LOS ANGELES
M • A.
,
SAN FRANCISCO STATE UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Nicholas Xenos
As the central expression of the principle of
justice, the idea of exchange has deep roots in the
classical Greek constitution of political community.
In the writings of Aristotle, the just material
transaction is crucial to the constitution of political
community. Aristotle's analysis of exchange in the
Nichomachean Ethics and the Politics attempts to
investigate the ways in which exchange can be rendered
in accordance with the principle of justice as an
equalizing reciprocity. However, as I show in the
first chapter of this work, Aristotle's treatment of
exchange in the Ethics does not succeed in creating a
formula for equivalency. Nor, in the subsequent
attempt to approach the issue of exchange in the
Politics, is Aristotle able to decisively separate
transgressive and unequal modes of exchange from
beneficial and fair ones. In the end, as I argue,
IV
Aristotle has discovered an aporia pointing to the
fundamental ambiguity of exchange - one which points,
moreover, to a troubling ambiguity with regard to the
nature of the bonds maintaining the polis.
The second chapter explores Mercantilist and
Physiocratic attempts to solves the problem of the
excessive remainder of exchange. The resolution of
Aristotle’s aporia
,
as I argue in the third chapter, is
found in the Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations. Smith's
epochal work endures less for its formal analytical
contributions than for the ideological content it
offers to market economics. My argument is, in
essence, that the ideological portion of the Wealth of
Nations is premised on a characterization of exchange
as qualitative and distributive. This positing of
exchange effects a turn on the Aristotelian treatment
of beneficial and/or non-transgressive exchange forms
in order to repress the quantitative issue of exchange-
value and the attendant issue of individual profit.
The suspension of quantitativity is not only necessary
to the supression of profit — but serves to formulate
a new characterization of exchange in which the
exchange transaction as disassociated from the
trappings of quantitativity now becomes a source for
ideological or "meta-economic" appropriations.
v
PREFACE
Material exchange presents a problem to theory.
Because exchange does not and can not effect a precise
substitution - similitude of objects transacted would
wholly negate the need for the activity - an essential
dissimilitude between exchangeable objects is reguisite
to any transaction. In the literature of the classical
Greeks, two competing representations of material
exchange evince this difficulty. In some instances,
the concept of economic exchange is cast as necessary,
natural and mutual, performing the reciprocal function
of provisioning and distributing goods. In a second
sense, exchange is presented as an adventitious
phenomenon which produces unfair gain -- and as such,
is a subversion of the bonds necessary to political
community.
The goal of this inquiry is to trace the
reverberations and implications of this classical
problem in the modern epoch; an epoch marked by the
transmogrification, both formally and ideologically, of
the paradox of exchange.
vi
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INTRODUCTION
To exchange gold for silver,
man... did take no profit from
such exchange.
• so tha t no
making
Chaucer
here is nothing which requires more tobe illustrated by philosophy thantrade.
Samuel Johnson
The concept of exchange has roots in the classical
Greek idea of justice, dike
, a harmonious association
m which the law of measure is observed or enacted. As
a law of measure, dike provides a corrective which
counters disorder, a corrective enacted through
reparation. 1 According to the cosmology of
Anaximander, nature functions as a self-regulating
equilibrium, and the settlement of justice entails
compensation through which the naturally opposed
elements
( stoicheia
)
are required to make reparations
{dike) to one another for their transgressions of the
order of the kosmos as they engage the process of
1 On early forms of Greek justice see Eric Havelock,
The Greek Concept of Justice : From Its Shadow in Homer
To Its Substance in Plato (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1978)
.
1
genesis-phthora. 2 To "get justice" is literally to
"get the equal" (isa essetai) and to "give justice"
(diken didonai) is literally "to pay the equal." 1 As
Gregory Vlastos notes, the words ameibo, allasso,
antapeibomai
, antallasso, amoibe
, apodosis, antapodosis
all apply to the "closure of a commercial transaction"
as well as to "the satisfaction of justice."' As a
pattern of thought applied to "physical sequences where
one event was regularly followed by (and thus
^
As Kimon Lycos writes, "It is important to realizehere that dike operates in a context which suggests a
cyclical process, a process of natural regeneration.
Disturbances' of what is apportioned have the role of
regenerating an order. Analogously, man, god, and
everything else, have a place in the order of 'honour'(time) established by moira. The essence of justice isto deal with others in accordance with that order, not
to encroach upon it."
( Plato on Justice and Power.[London: Macmillan Press, 1987], p. 178, nt. 42). Cf.
Parminedes, Frag. 1. 13—4 and Frag. 8. 36-8; and
Heraclitus, Frag. 94. For a useful sketch of
Anaximander, see W.K.C. Guthrie, A History of Greek
Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1962) . Also see Leon Robin, Greek Thought (New York:
Knopf, 1928) and especially C.H. Kahn, Anaximander and
the Origins of Greek Cosmology (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1960)
.
3 See for example, Odyssey, ii. 203.
4 Gregory Vlastos, "Equality and Justice in Early
Greek Cosmologies," Classical Philology 41-6 (1947),
pp. 173-174, nt. 158.
2
"exchanged for") its reciprocal,” this reciprocity is
enacted through substitution - a standing-in of one
element for another. 5
However, as dispensed by the Gods, the early forms
of dike were largely arbitrary actions, and as a
consequence, justice was not fully intelligible to
human understanding.* As Werner Jaeger has argued, it
is the poet statesman Solon who is responsible for
reappropriating the idea of justice from its
cosmological and theological sources and establishing
it as a comprehensive and comprehensible political
" the cycle of birth ^d death (Phaedo71e /2b); waking and sleeping
( Phaedo 72b); thesecession of day and night (e.g. Hesiod, Theog. 749)-the cycle of the seasons (Philo De incorr. mundi 109)*
^ Vhf fbribe the g^und in turn (Pindar, Pyth. 4.Vlastos n°tes, "scientific thought used thispattern to join events which had either been left
unconnected (like evaporation and precipitation (ArisMeteor 355a28) or else had not been clearly grasped^sstrict equations by the popular mind (like breathing inand breathing. out [Plato Tim. 79e7-8; or the stretching
of a lyre string and the vibration when released[Aris. Mech. prob. 803a31]). But the uniformity of
nature as a whole could also be construed as just such
a reciprocity among its basic components." ("Equality
and Justice in Early Greek Cosmologies," pp. 173 - 174
,nt . 158).
6 The unintelligibility of the notion of dike is
further
. explained by the fact that it was bound up with
the belief in fate {moira ) which is also linked to the
reigning principles of rightful share or just
proportion (aisa), thus operating, as Vlastos notes,
"on the assumption that what is fated is to be
'approximate' or of the 'right order'." ("Equality and
Justice in Early Greek Cosmologies," pp. 160-1). Cf.
W.C. Greene, Moira
, Fate, Good and Evil in Greek
Thought (New York: Harper and Row Torchbooks, 1963)
.
3
order; that is, as an observable social consequence of
human (trans) action.’ This rationalization
of dike is essential to Solon's Eunomie (literally,
"right order") in response to the contemporary crisis
of political and social disorder (stasis )
.
8
The shift from a theological or cosmological dike
to one conditioned solely by the affairs of humans is
historically confluent with the emergence of coinage as
a means to regulate material transactions in human
communities now understood expressly as political
associations
. The money form supports the new idea of
7
See Jaeger's "Solon: Creator of Athenian Political
?
U
m
Ure
v ^
Paideia: The ideals of Greek Culture
,
vol.
I (New York: Oxford University Press, 1945)
. Also seeA. French, "The Economic Background to Solon's
ReformS ," The Classical Quarterly, n.s. 6, nos. 1,2(lyhb), pp. 69 85. Such a rationalizing impulse was
also being carried out in cosmological theories.
Vlastos notes that Empedocles "rationalizes aisa
exactly as Parmenides
...rationalized moira, and
Anaximander chreon (fateful necessity)." ("Equality andJustice in Early Greek Cosmologies," pp. 173-174, nt.
158) .
8 In Hesiod's Theogony, Eunomia is the Sister of Dike.
On stasis
,
see G.E.M. De Ste. Croix, The Class Strugglein the Ancient World (London: Duckworth, 1981) and M.I.
Finley, "Athenian Demagogues" in Studies in Ancient
Society
,
ed. M.I. Finley (London: Routledge, Kegan &
Paul, 1971), pp. 5-6, and attendant references. See
also M.M. Austin and P. Vidal-Naquet, Economic and
Social History of Ancient Greece (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1977)
.
9
_
See Michael Rostovtzeff, The Social and Economic
History of the Hellenistic World (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1941) and Karl Polanyi, "The Semantics of Money-
Uses," in Primitive, Archaic and Modern Economies
(Garden City, N.Y.
:
Anchor Books, 1968)
.
4
the citizen, as based upon an understanding of a
similarity among members; they are homoimoi, "men who
are alike." 10 As Vernant writes, the issuing of money
with the seal of the city served as a means for
...codifying, regulating and coordinating theexchange of goods and services among citizensaccording to an exact numerical valuation
^ h i
ectual leve1
'
for the old im*ge ofealth as ybns -- so charged with affectiveforce legal tender substituted for the abstractidea of nomisma, a social standard of value arational contrivance that allowed for a common
measure of diverse realities, and thus equalizedexchange as a social relationship. 11
The promise of equality and commonality marking
the confluence between money and the ends of the polis
was not, however, to be fully enacted in practice. I
suggest that this imprecision forms one element of
Gregory Vlastos’ observation that although political
justice was drawn by Solon as a self-regulating social
process, distributive justice, the justice governing
10 Vernant writes, "On the political level the
citizens conceived of themselves as interchangeable
units within a system whose law was the balance of
power and whose norm was equality." (The Origins of
Greek Thought, p. 61)
.
11 Vernant, The Origins of Greek Thought, p. 95.
Vernant attributes this argument to E. Will,
Korinthiaka: Recherches sur l'histoire et la
civilisation de Corinthe des origens aux guerres
mediques (Paris, 1955), pp. 495-502. (See Vernant, The
Origins of Greek Thought, p. 94, nt . 10 for other
citations)
.
5
acquisition, "lagged behind" the justice of the polls;
essentially, no "immediate reparation existed to
regulate the acquisition and the process of wealth." 12
In its most subtle form, this issue of
distributive justice hinges on the paradoxical nature
of the exchange relation: it is voluntary and
transactive, yet, as such, it never performs a perfect
"substitution." Well past the epochs of lawless
usurpation of property which occupied earlier writers
such as Hesiod, the pivotal material issue at stake for
Aristotle's reflections on the polls is the relation
between citizens as refracted through the fair exchange
of goods and coinage -- the extension of the central
principle of justice, Isonomla, to quotidian material
transactions
.
13
Although Aristotle's treatment of exchange is
widely dispersed within a diverse secondary literature,
12 Vlastos, "Solonian Justice," Classical Philology
,
XLV (April 1946), pp. 75-77. Vlastos also refers us to
Maurice Croiset's discussion in "La Morale et ,1a cite
dans les poesies de Solon," Compt. rend. Acad. Inscrlp.
et Belles-Lettres
,
(Paris: 1903).
13 The "wealth-getting" which concerns Aristotle is
thus not that of the kind which exists between the
propertied citizens who extract surplus through the
use of slave labor or debt-bondage, but the sort which
emphasizes the economic interaction been equals, that
is, between citizens. On slavery in the classical
Greek world, see M.I. Finley, Slavery and Classical
Antiquity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1968)
.
6
the issue makes its most sustained appearance in a
debate which contains significant claims regarding the
relation between, and subsequently the respective
characteristics of, classical Greek and modern
economics. The ground of this controversy was laid in
the 1860's in the work of Karl Rodbertus, who set out a
theorem which was to be the grist of a debate engaged
some thirty years later by Karl Buchner and Eduard
Meyer over the degree of development in the ancient
Greek economy. 1 ' Following Buchner, the
substantivists or "primitivists" assert a radical
disparity between the economies of antiquity and
modernity, arguing that because for the ancients,
economic behavior was embedded in non-economic aspects
of life, it was therefore determined by cultural
practices and not by maximizing decisions. 15 For
14 For a good summary of the early forms of the debate
see Harry W. Pearson, "The Secular Debate on Economic
Primitivism in Trade and Market in Early Empires
,
Karl
Polanyi, Conrad M. Arensberg and Harry w. Pearson, eds(Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1957). See also Percy S.
Cohen, "Economic Analysis and Economic Man: Some
Comments on a Controversy, " in Themes in Economic
Anthropology, ed. Raymond W. Firth (London: Tavistock,
1967)
, pp . 91-118; Scott Meikle, "The Ancient 'Economy'
and its Literature," in Aristotle's Economic Thought
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) ; and the bibliography
in M.I. Rostovtzef f , Social and Economic History of the
Hellenistic World III (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1941)
,
pp. 1327-28, nt . 25.
15 The separateness of the economy finds one of its
earliest modern expressions expression in Hegel's
Philosophy of Right. The distinction between embedded
and disembedded economies may be likewise compared also
7
Buchner and his followers, this distinction marks both
a critical divergence between ancient and modern
economic modes as well as the inapplicability of modern
analysis to ancient economic modes. The moderns, to
the contrary, assert that no such radical divergence in
terms of economic practice exists between the two
epochs. As M. Rostovtzef f phrases it, "modern
capitalistic development... differs from the ancient
only in quantity and not in quality"; according to the
moderns, modern economic theory is consequently
applicable to the study of ancient economies. 16
to Ferdinand Toennies' Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft
^Co^unity and Association [London: Routledge, Keegan s
solidar?tv (The n
le
•
Urkhe
i
m s mechanica l and organici y Division of Labor in SocietyFree Press]) and Henry Sumner Maine's status
contract
( Ancient Law [Boston: Beacon PressMost recently this notion is associated withPolanyi. {"Aristotle Discovers the Economy,"
Polanyi, Conrad M. Arensberg and Harry W. Pearson
Regneryf
i
1957]
I
f
Market in Early EmPires [Chicago: 'Henry
[New York
and
1963] )
.
Karl
in Karl
16 M Rostovtzef f cited in J.H. D'Arms, Commerce andSocial Standing in Ancient Rome (Cambridge: Harvard
Press
' 1981), p. 12. Also see Scott Cook,
s Obsolete Anti -Market' Mentality: A Critigue ofthe Substantive Approach to Economic Anthropology "
American Anthropologist, April 1966, pp. 323-45.
Economic historians associated with this position havein some cases aligned Aristotle's work with central
tenets of the nineteenth-century neo-classical
revolution in economic thought which poses subjective
preference as the hinge of economic analysis. See for
example, Emil Kauder, ("Genesis of Marginal Utility
Theory," Economic Journal 63 [1953], pp. 638-50); and
Joseph Soudek ("Aristotle's Theory of Exchange: An
Inquiry into the Origin of Economic Analysis,"
Proceedings of the American Philosophy Society 96
[1952 ] , pp . 45-75)
.
8
The treatment of Aristotle by both the
pnmitivists and the moderns is, in several key
instances, problematic. The primitivists, for example,
m posing Aristotle as an exemplary representative of
the embedded economy, present a picture of exchange
which is organized around needs, use-values and the
household (oikos)
.
However, to read Aristotle
' s
approach to economic matters primarily through the
principles of simple necessity and use-value serve to
over-simplify the enigmatic relation of wealth to the
polis, which as Aristotle recognized, is an entity
which requires certain forms of material superfluity in
order to free its members from the constraints
associated with mere physical life (zoe). 17
I 7
.
a reading of Aristotle extends well beyond theprimitive/modern debate. One of the more extensive
versions is found in a work by Eric Havelock which
claims to have uncovered a Greek "liberal" tradition
which has been overwhelmed by the canonical emphasis onPlato and Aristotle: "For Plato, as for Aristotle, thedeveloped commercial community, which is well enough
organized to produce a surplus for at least part of itspopulation to enjoy, represented a condition of socialdisaffection or abnormality." (The Liberal Temper in
Greek Politics [London: Jonathan Cape, 1957], p. 384).
According to Havelock, Democritus, Protagorus, Antiphon
and their fourth-century successors represent a non-
Platonic tradition of thought built on the
"anthropologies of the pre-Socratic" (the vestiges of
the latter found in Aeschylus, Sophocles and
Euripides) : "What is at least clear is that the
liberals envisaged the production of material wealth as
a proper goal of community, and that they could
abstract goods and services as a significant factor in
human life and that they traced a parallel between
increasing integration in community and increasing
production of wealth." (p. 386.) To assert the
9
Furthermore, as suggested above, in the polls money,
the expression of exchange-value, performs a critical
public function as a mediating standard — a function
which is widely neglected by analyses which focus on
the oikos. As for the claims of the modernists, a more
fundamental problem exists. The application of modern
theories of investment, banking and economic policy to
ancient society belies an acute insensitivity to
historical evidence. 18 Despite the abundance of
empirical and conceptual criticism, the most serious of
which issuing from the work of Max Weber, Johannes
Hasebroek and Moses I. Finely, 5 " the modernist stance
yet persists. That despite all, this controversy
"refuses to lie down," 20 is due to the sizable stakes
argument as not concerning simply wealth but unlimited
wealth would shift Havelock's position onto more
productive and accurate territory. As it is, Barry
Gordon agrees that Havelock's strictures concerning
Aristotle are too severe. ("Aristotle and Hesiod: The
Economic Problem in Greek Thought, " .Review of Social
Economy 21 [1963], p. 152).
18 This insensitivity extends to the most fundamental
usages of terms; for example, even the word "economy"
must be regarded with great caution when used in the
classical Greek context as there is no direct
equivalent for the term in modern English usage —
oikonomike was used principally in the sense of the art
of household management or the management of a city.
See especially Kurt Singer, "Oikonomia: The Origins of
Economic Thought and Language," Kyklos 11 (1958).
19 See Finley, "Aristotle and Economic Analysis."
20 P. Millet, Lending and Borrowing in Ancient Athens
(Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 9 and
10
which lie at the source of the contention. These
stakes involve the struggle over the definitive
representation of modern market economies: on the one
hand, as a trajectory reflecting a "natural" or
organic” socio-historic process, or, on the other
hand, understood as a politico-social phenomenon
unprecedented in human history. 21
As symptoms of a much larger ideological battle,
the issues governing the primitivist/modern debate
erupt in varying forms in the broader discourses of
21 Scott Meikle suggests that "Markets existed in
societies of many kinds for millennia without those
societies being or becoming market economies A
society can become entirely regulated by exchange-valuedistinction between production and circulation of
exchange values versus capital system only if there is
a market in capital, and that in turn is possible only
when there is a serious market in labor, that is, whenlabour is generally supplied in the form of an
exchange-value (labour capacity or ’labour power')
which capital can buy. These are the defining
conditions of a market economy, and neither condition
was obtained in the ancient world. Virtually all
lending was eranos lending, and, as Millett notes, a
survey of the known motives behind eranos or 'friendly'
loans reveals no instance of a productive outcome."
{Aristotle’ s Economic Thought [Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1995], pp. 162-3). The authors claiming an
Aristotelian heritage for the market include: J. Soudek
(Aristotle's Theory of Exchange: an Enquiry into the
Origin of Economic Analysis," Proceedings of the
American Philosophical Society, 96 [1952], pp. 45-75);
W.F.R. Hardie ( Aristotle’s Ethical Theory [Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1968], pp. 191-201); Barry J. Gordon
("Aristotle and the Development of Value Theory,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics 78 [1964], pp. 115-28),
("Aristotle and Hesiod: The Economic Problem in Greek
Thought," Review of Social Economy 21 [1963], pp. 147-
56); and S. Todd Lowry (The Archeology of Economic
Ideas [Durham: Duke University Press, 1987]).
11
market economics, particularly those espousing
fundamentalist laissez-faire values. The authority
most commonly invoked in such polemics is that if the
author widely regarded as the architect of the modern
free-market economic system, Adam Smith. Smith's
Wealth of Nations remains a pivotal resource for
ideological provisions which continue to robustly
underpin the ethos of the ever-expanding scope of the
late-modern market economy. 22 As Gregory Lukacs has
phrased it, Smith is responsible for some of the "great
scientific pronouncements of the bourgeois class." 23
My approach to Smith is organized around what
appears to be a fundamental division in the Wealth of
Nations
,
a division organized around the introduction
of the price mechanism in the sixth chapter of Book I.
The first portion of the Wealth carries the bulk of the
aphoristic material, including assertions which have
been characterized by some commentators as
22 This expansion occurs in two forms: within
established market economies in which the market ethos
is extended into spheres previously outside the reach
of market forces such as health care, education and the
human services; and secondly, the geographical
expansion of advanced market forms ("globalization")
.
With regard to the ideas broadly associated with neo-
liberal attributes of market economies, I use the word
"ideology" polemically.
23 Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness
,
trans. R.
Livingston (London: Merlin Press, 1971), p. 225.
12
"metaphysical whereas the remainder of the work
addresses the topic largely in terms of more empirical
economic phenomena
— prices of wheat, trade treaties
and taxes, although such topics as education and
religious instruction are also included. Because the
first portion of the work establishes, as it were
the ideological prologue for the more properly economic
argument, the reader is presented with a highly
freighted narrative.
The first portion of the work is commonly
understood to be propelled by Smith’s assertion of the
division of labor as the sole source for a greater
collective wealth, a "universal opulence." I will
argue that the pervasive elements conditioning this
chapter address the classical paradigm of economic gain
as a zero-sum.
Propelled by the productive capacity of the
division of labor. Smith's argument runs alongside a
very selective representation of exchange. The object
24 The term is Louis Dumont's, who makes the point
with regard to Smith's assertion in chapter five that
value consists in labour and only labour can measure
it." ( From Mandeville to Marx: The Genesis and Triumph
of Economic Ideology [Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1977], pp. 88 and passim) . Also see Dumont's
comments on the relation between chapter five, six and
seven of Book I of the Wealth of Nations as well as
Gunnar Myrdal, The Political Element in the Development
of Economic Theory, trans. Paul Streetan (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1955)
.
13
of exchange in this first section is uniformly cast as
a provisioning function, which is altogether liberated
from the accumulation of "wealth" — now shifted to the
division of labor — permitting Smith to avoid all the
tortured deliberations of his forebears on the subject
of exchange-value. In the Wealth of Nations
,
under the
aegis of the division of labor, the issue of unequal
gain is suspended until Smith has recourse to a form of
individual gain as enacted through his concept of the
price mechanism, wherein profit becomes part of a
process outside the immediacy of the single exchange
transaction.
As framed by Aristotle’s analysis of exchange, the
first portion of the Wealth of Nations reveals an
attempt to resolve the issue with which the classical
tradition struggled namely, to reconcile individual
pecuniary gain with "common benefit." Smith’s
presentation of the concept of exchange are especially
compelling insofar as his language, in preparing the
ground for a redeemed and legitimated conception of
individual gain, relies upon a primitive account of
exchange which often appears to be in conformity with
the most simple demands of the oikos. Here, exchange
14
IS portrayed as a distribution of goods, while "wealth"
does not signify money, but a magnitude of useful
material necessities. 25
The conception of exchange which is contained in
the first portion of the Wealth of Nations
,
by
emphasizing mutuality to the exclusion of profit,
provides the central ideological cornerstone of the
work. The effort at hand attempts a textual archeology
of this ideological pivot, pursuing the sources of what
Marx has referred to as the "sphere of circulation"
which mystically renders each transaction equal, while
contributing to what has been referred to by Elie
Halevy as the doctrine of the mutuality of interests. 26
25 Smith makes three direct references to Aristotle inthe Wealth of Nations, none of which deal with thediscussion of exchange in the Politics or the Ethics.
Meikle speculates that the references, which deal withhistorical or political events, seem to have originated
not , from a direct study of Aristotle, but from Smith's
familiarity with Pufendorf and Montesquieu.
(Aristotle's Economic Thought, p. 110) . For a reading
of Smith which places him in the context of early Greek
thought, see Vernard Foley, The Social Physics of Adam
Smith (West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University
Press, 1976) .
26 Karl Marx, Capital, vol
. I (New York: International
Publishers, 1967); Elie Halevy, The Growth of
Philosophic Radicalism
,
vol. Ill (London: Faber &
Faber, 1928) . As Marx writes, "This sphere (of
circulation) ... is in fact a very Eden of the innate
rights of man. There alone rule Freedom, Equality,
Property and Bentham. Freedom, because both buyer and
seller of a commodity, say of labour-power, are
constrained only by their own free will. They contract
as free agents, and the agreement they come to, is but
the form in which they give legal expression to their
common will. Equality, because each enter into
15
of Nations is
Although the significance of the Wealth
widely argued to be the way in which Smith synthesizes
a series of disparate economic principles into what was
at the time the most comprehensive analytical
representation of the nascent free market economy, 27 I
will suggest that the most enduring contribution of
Smith lies, rather, in the way in which he displaced
the formerly intractable issue of individual monetary
gain while "solving" — if by a primitive slight of
hand the problems associated with exchange and
rendering it as an iconic linchpin of the modern market
economy.
relation with the other, as with a simple owner of
commodities, and they exchange equivalent for
equivalent. Property, because each only disposes of
what is his own. And Bentham, because each only looks
to himself." ( Capital , vol. I, p. 176).
27 Jacob Viner, "Adam Smith, " International
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (1968)
.
Reprinted
in J.C. Wood, ed., Adam Smith: Critical Assessments
(London: Croom Helm, 1984). For a more critical
approach to the scope and magnitude of Smith's
analytical contributions see Salim Rashid, The Myth of
Adam Smith (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1998)
.
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CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEM OF EXCHANGE IN CLASSICAL GREEK THOUGHT
J t is by taking part in transactions
with our fellow men that some of usbecome just and others unjust.
Aristotle28
A. Aristotle: The Nichomachean Ethics29
Aristotle's notion of "particular justice" 30 as
conditioned by the imperative of "having one's own" (ta
auton)
,
] and defined as "the equal" (to ison) i2 signals
28 Nichomachean Ethics
,
trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1934), 1103bl6. Hereafter
referred to as the Ethics.
29 The Nichomachean Ethics and the Eudemian Ethics
have three books in common, the book of our central
concern in the Nichomachean Ethics
,
book five, being
nearly identical to the fourth book of the Eudemian
Ethics. For an account of the relationship between the
two works, see A.J.P. Kenny, The Aristotelian Ethics: A
Study of the Relationship Between the Eudemian and
Nichomachean Ethics of Aristotle (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1978) .
30 Aristotle's division of justice into two
categories, "universal" and "particular" marks a shift
from the unified Platonic notion. As Ernest Barker
notes, "while Plato's formula is that each individual
should do his own, Aristotle's formula is that each
individual should have his own." (The Political Thought
of Plato and Aristotle [New York: Russell & Russell,
1959]
,
p. 340, nt. 1)
.
31 Aristotle, Ethics
,
1133b6-12, 1132a29-36, 1134a32-
35.
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the importance of the exchange relation. Particular
justice is divided by Aristotle into three categories:
corrective justice, or diorthorikos
,
literally meaning
"straightening out," and entails the restoration of
equality occurring in either voluntary or involuntary
private transactions [synallegmata] ; transactions of
the former kind include sales, loans, deposits, pledges
and leases. J Early in his discussion of corrective
32
+.u
n
i
eS
?
otherwise noted, the translation to be usedis that of Martin Ostwald's Nichomachean Ethics(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962). As GregoryVlastos notes, "The linguistic bond of justice with
equality was even closer for the Greeks than it is for
us: to ison, isotes, would be the very words to whichthey would turn for a natural, unstrained, one-word
variant, for to dikaion, diaiosuon." ("Theory ofSocial Justice, " in Helen North ed., Interpretations ofPlato [Leiden, The Netherlands: E.J. Brill, 1977], pp .18-19)
. As Michael De Goyer writes, "At its deepestlevel, the fundamental difficulty repeatedly posed in
Aristotle’s treatment of justice resides in the fact
that the words justice and equality constituted direct
synonyms." ("The Marxian Matrix," in Marx and
Aristotle : Nineteenth Century German Social Theory and
Classical Antiquity [Savage, Maryland: Roman &
Littlefield, 1992], p. 130).
33 These are generally private transactions, but in
some instances the injured party is a public official
( Ethics
,
1132b23-30) or the polis itself ( Ethics ,
1138al2-14)
. Involuntary transactions, on the other
hand, are in some instances clandestine, as theft,
adultery, poisoning or assassination. Others occur
under constraint as assault, imprisonment, murder,
violent robbery, maiming or defamation. ( Ethics
,
1131a3-9) . It is well to note that the secondary
literature is not unanimous on the usage of
synallegmata as rendering transaction in the sense of
contract or exchange. Ross and Barker are among the
majority in the former instance, while J. Burnett and
A. Grants adduce corrective justice to be governing
rightful exchange transactions as well as giving
redress for unjust ones. With regard to voluntary and
18
justice, Aristotle establishes the parameters of the
problem in terms of an exchange transaction. As he
writes.
the terms loss
( zepia
)
and gain
( kerdos
)
in thesecases come from voluntary exchange. To possess
more than what was one's own (previously) is calledmaking a gain', and to have less than one started
out with is called 'incurring a loss’ in buying
selling, and all other transactions
(synallagmata) sanctioned by law.... 34
He continues:
But when neither party has more or less but exactly
what they contributed to the transaction, they say
they 'have their own' (t a auton ) without loss or
without gain. 35
Aristotle tells us that in order for "the mean between
profit and loss" to be established, 36 the "loss" and
"gain" incurred must be measurable. 37 Given that this
condition is met, the symmetrical structure of exchange
may enact an immanent means of measure: one simply
measures the pre-transaction amount against that of the
involuntary acts, see H.H. Joachim's commentary on the
Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1951), pp.
136-7.
34 Aristotle, Ethics, 1132bl2-17
.
35 Aristotle, Ethics, 1132b21-23
36 Aristotle, Ethics, 1132al7-19
37 Aristotle, Ethics, 1132al0-15
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post transaction.'" Summarily, imbalance is revealed
by the symmetrical shape of the modality as itself an
expression of isonomia
.
39 Through transactive
reflexivity the exchange modality thus establishes a
matrix which expresses the criteria of the "just."
Despite his early acknowledgement of the
inapplicability of such precise "arithmetical"
restitution to all forms of corrective justice, 40 the
lure of an exactitude of calculability, a precision
which permits the judge to "subtract from the side of
gam in the defendant’s ledger," is a very Aristotelian
temptation. 41
This particular calculation of eguality in
transaction is inapplicable en toto to a second
category of particular justice. "Distributive" justice
38 In order to maintain this proportion, it is thus
mandatory that the contravening parties are regarded as
equal: "For it makes no difference whether a good man
has defrauded a bad man or a bad one a good one... the
law looks only at the nature of the damage, treating
the parties as equal, and merely asking whether one has
done and the other has suffered injustice, whether one
inflicted and the other has sustained damage." (Ethics,
1132a2-7)
.
39 "When the whole has been divided into two halves,
people then say that they ’have their own’ ( ta auton )
,
having got what is equal." (Ethics, 1132a26-34.
40 Aristotle, Ethics, 1132all-12. For example, in the
"calculation" of compensatory damages in the case of
assault, murder or maiming. (Ethics, 1131a3-9)
.
41 See also Aristotle, Ethics, 1131al0-12.
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entails the allotment of honor, wealth, political
position as well as payment
(misthos
)
for attending the
assembly and law courts, as based upon a proportionate
due approximated by one’s contribution to the
community. 42 Aristotle begins his account of
distributive justice by asserting that since the unjust
man is one who is unfair (anison)
,
and the unjust is
unequal {anisou)
,
"it is obvious that there exists a
median term between the two extremes of inequality.
This is the fair or equal." 4 ' As he continues,
In as much as it is a median, it must be medianbetween some extremes i.e., between the more and
the less; inasmuch as it is equal, it involves two
shares that are equal; and inasmuch as it is just,it must be just for certain parties. Consequently
the just involves at least four terms.... 44
The two quantitative terms (more and less) which
informed the account of corrective justice are here
cast by Aristotle as inadequate to the task of
determining equality in distributive justice; an
42 The adjective distributive, dianemetikos, is
associated with the nouns nome and dianome and the
verbs nemein and deanemein, "to distribute."
43 Aristotle, Ethics, 1131al0-13. Initially
introduced in Book II of the Ethics, the mean (meson)
is a synonym for "moderate" or "of the right amount."
The conception of the mean, rooted in Greek
mathematics, signifies the middle or middle space in
general. The mean can also indicate a middle term in a
continuous three stage progression, e.g. the mid-point
between extremes.
44 Aristotle, Ethics, 1131al5-21.
21
inadequacy due to the qualitative differences in merit
between parties which is to govern distributive
restitution.
Equality m distributive justice can not therefore
be arithmetically equal, but rather, it consists of the
proper analogia, or "equality of ratios" necessary to
confer offices and rewards according to the degree of
contribution.’ 5 As opposed to the prior instance, the
factors which determine justice are now expanded to "at
least' four terms: the two shares involved, and the two
people involved. The rupture from arithmetic
calculation as imposed by the need for analogical
proportion involves the difficulty of establishing a
common valuation based on a non-quantitative valuation
(&xia)
. As Aristotle writes, although all are agreed
that "the just share must be given on the basis of what
one deserves,
"
46 there is no clear agreement on the
standard: "democrats say free birth, oligarchs that it
is wealth or noble birth, and aristocrats that it is
excellence
.
,M7
45 Aristotle, Ethics, 131a29-31.
46 Aristotle, Ethics, 1131a24-25.
47 Aristotle, Ethics, 1 131a25-29
.
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Aristotle's discussion of justice in "commercial"
exchange, chapter five of Book V, begins the economic
discussion of these issues. « Justice in commercial
exchange, as Aristotle tells us, is concerned with
"communities of exchange.'"’ The stakes with regard to
the political koinonia are immense: Aristotle tells us
that without fair material exchange "there is no
community."-’ Commercial exchange occupies a peculiar
position in Aristotle's trajectory of justice. Unlike
48 The construction of the argument has lead even
appreciative readers such as James Bonar to refer tothe chapter as much tortured."
( Philosophy and
Political Economy
,
[New York: Augustus M. Kelley
1966]
,
p. 40) . I will take this opportunity to
acknowledge my debt to Scott Meikle's careful reading
of Book Five which articulates the importance of
Aristotle s metaphysics to his analysis of exchange.
49 Or "associations based on mutual exchange" (to
antipeponthos kat' analogian )
.
(Ethics, 1132b31-3)
.
Finley’s translation "les relations d'echange qui ontpour cadre le communaute" also usefully expands
Rackham's "interchange of services." Nineteenth
century commentators generally treated fair exchange as
merely a division of particular justice. D.G. Ritchie
argues, however, that to treat it is this way is to
diminish its importance, for justice between exchangers
"catallactic justice" — lay at the foundation of
the polis in a way that particular justices did not.
("Aristotle's Subdivisions of Particular Justice"
Classical Review, 7 [1894]). As Meikle, following
Ritchie, suggests, Aristotle holds fair exchange above
other forms of particular justice as it contributes to
the fundamental condition of philia. Philia, as Meikle
reminds us, is inadequately translated as
"friendship," rather, it is more accurately rendered as
a form of mutuality related to dikaion or fairness.
50 Aristotle, Ethics, 1133bl7-18.
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the two prior forms of justice, the justice related to
exchange lies outside of scope of private suit (dike
ldia)
. Commercial exchange occupies a space "where the
law gives immunity," that is, it does not give
recompense for inequality resulting from the
"contract .
"
Aristotle begins the chapter with a discussion
which has the air of a rumination: "Some people believe
with the Pythagoreans that the just in the unqualified
sense is reciprocity (antipeponthos)
... suffering that
which one has done to another." 51 To "get justice" is
literally to "get the equal" (isa essetai) and to "give
justice" ( diken didonai
)
is literally, "to pay the
equal a principle of transaction or exchange found
likewise in the well-known Pythagorean lex talionis,
the "eye for an eye." Aristotle oscillates between two
positions in this initial section. As we are told,
Pythagorean reciprocity is often at variance with
corrective or distributive justice, "for there are many
cases in which reciprocity and the just are not
identical"; yet, as Aristotle writes, "people interpret
even Rhamdamanthys ' rule of the just in this sense: "If
51 Aristotle, Ethics
,
1132b21-24. Cf. Magna Moralia,
1194a29
.
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he suffers what he committed, then justice will be
straight"- and "people seek either to requite evil with
evil... or good with good, for otherwise there is no
mutual contribution.
"
53 Aristotle concludes, however,
that with regard to commercial exchange, the
Pythagorean definition of justice is not applicable.
As we are told.
the just constitutes the bond that holds the
association together, that is, reciprocity in termsof proportion not in terms of exact equality in thereturn For it is the reciprocal return of what isproportional (to what one has received) that holdsthe state together. 54
The exact return" to which Aristotle here refers
is thus not a literal recompense — an "eye for an
eye." JJ The problem of equalization which faces
52 Aristotle, Ethics
,
1132b25-28.
53 Aristotle, Ethics, 1132b37-1133a2
.
54 Aristotle, Ethics, 1132b32-37. Meikle translates
as "fair exchange is the salvation of states," which
follows his translation of Politics, 1261a30-31:
"Wherefore the principle of reciprocity (to ison to
antipenponthos) as I have already remarked in the
Ethics, is the salvation of states." And here is
Ostwald's version of this passage: "The very existence
of the state depends on proportionate reciprocity."
Finally, compare also to Rackham: "But in the
interchange of services Justice in the form of
Reciprocity is the bond that maintains the
association." (Cf. Magna Moralia 1194al6f) .
55 As Ostwald notes, "reciprocity ( antipeponthos )
means literally 'suffering in return for one's action'
and comes close to the concepts of 'an eye for an eye'
and 'let the punishment fit the crime." (Ethics, p.
123, nt. 30.)
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Aristotle in this section is, rather, to analogically
render a transitive symmetry from asymmetry. To render
the unequal equal (isasthenai)
, Aristotle suggests the
deployment of a diagonal combination of terms. 56 with
this matrix, it may be possible to create a
"reciprocity of proportion" 57 through an "equality of
proportion"
:
58
"if (first) proportional reciprocity is
established between goods, and (second) reciprocity
effected, the fair exchange
.. .will be realized." 59
What is at stake in this attempt to establish a
precise equalization is compactly phrased: "And when
they exchange their products they must reduce them to a
form of proportion, otherwise one of the two extremes
will have both the excesses." 60
56 "Let A be a builder, B a shoemaker, C a house, andD a shoe. The "diagonal combination" as diagrammed byOstwald is a figure in the form of an X on either side
of which is grouped the alternate transactor and his
rrnoH nff.r.H ^ of four terms. (Ethics, p125
,
nt. 34)
.
57 Aristotle, Ethics,
58 Aristotle, Ethics,
59 Aristotle, Ethics,
60 Aristotle, Ethics, 133b6-7 (italics added)
.
Rackham clarifies this passage in the following
footnote: "After any unfair exchange one party has too
much by just the amount that by which the other has too
little. I ought to give you ten shillings more or
something worth that. Then I have ten shillings too
much, and you have ten too little; these two tens are
my two ’excesses’."
26
Before any of these equalizations can be effected,
Aristotle tells us that the two objects which are to be
exchanged must be rendered "comparable in a way"
( sumbleta pos), fcl a phrase which he soon after
clarifies as commensurability
( summetria ) , 62 The
overarching significance of this concept emerges in
Aristotle's stipulation that not only is there "no
community without exchange" but "there is no exchange
without equality, and no equality without
commensurability." 63 it is well to note that in the
broadest sense, the notion of commensurability is
related to the history of the Greek term oikos which
involves "a preoccupation with the political aspects of
human intercourse
( justice) ... and the impassioned
searching for what is universal in things at first
sight widely differing from each another." 64
61 Aristotle, Ethics
,
1133al9.
62 Aristotle, Ethics
,
1133bl6, 18, 19, 22.
63 Aristotle, Ethics
,
1133bl7-18. As noted by Meikle,
"This commensurability of things that are different by
nature, which is logically presupposed by proportions
of them being equated, is the core of the problem which
exchange presents to economics, though it is one which
economists have rarely confronted head-on."
( Aristotle's Economic Thought
,
p. 13).
64 K. Singer, "Oikonomia: The Origins of Economic
Thought and Language," p. 35.
To render two disparate objects which are to be
brought together in a transaction "comparable in a way"
is to identify a property shared by both objects.
However, Aristotle's account does not address the
problem of how objects are to be equalized. In fact,
we are never told at any point in chapter five how this
direct equalization is to be enacted.
As Meikle suggests, this problem must be
understood in terms of Aristotle's metaphysics.
Objects, as existing within the category of
"substances" are qualitatively different things; thus,
objects can be compared -- another indication of the
need for the shift from the arithmetic to the
analogical. The result of such comparison, however,
can not be quantitative, as permitting the ability of
measurement necessary to equalization. 65 Thus,
commensurability must occur in the dimension where
65 "Most distinctive of a quantity is its being called
both equal and unequal... For example, a body is called
both equal and unequal, and so is a time... But anything
else — whatever is not a quantity — is certainly not,
it would seem, called equal and unequal. For example,
a condition is certainly not equal and unequal, but
similar." ( Categories , 6a26-36) . And again: "the
measure is always homogeneous with the thing measured;
the measure of spatial magnitudes is a spatial
magnitude, and in particular that of a length is a
length, that of a breadth a breadth, that of an
articulate sound an articulate sound, that of weight a
weight, that of units a unit." (Metaphysics 1053a24
ff.)
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measurement is to be made. As Meikle writes, "because
the equalization of objects demands a quantification,
and to make them commensurable -- in conformity with
Aristotle’s categories -- would entail the
determination of what they are quantities of... this is
what the problem of commensurability amounts to." 66
The codetermination of equalization and
quanti tativity marks a significant point in Aristotle's
analysis, as now drawn toward the precision of the
money form. That such a quantitative valuation must be
assigned to exchange is, as noted in the introduction,
a function of instituting general valuation, or, to
phrase it differently, a means for the koinonis to
regulate the exchange transaction through an assertion
of a common valuation. As we are told, because
everything that enters into an exchange must somehow
be comparable," it is "for this purpose that money has
been introduced." 67
As a solution to the task of commensurability,
money affords a means of creating a relation between
objects by representing, in a measure common to both,
the value of each object to be transacted. This third
element does not appear to be directly related to the
properties of the objects themselves; rather, it is
66 Meikle, Aristotle's Economic Thought, p. 15.
67 Aristotle, Ethics, 1133al9.
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posed as a solution to the difficulty of
commensurability precisely because of its autonomous
operation. Money is characterized by Aristotle as a
median or "middle" term, for it has the ability to
"measure all things, (not only their equality but) also
the amount by which they exceed or fall short (of one
another)." 68 However as the Greek root of the word
indicates, currency is conventional -- and thus
unstable: 69 as Aristotle tells us, because money has
the name of "currency" or nomos, it does not exist by
nature, and it is in our power to "change and
invalidate it." 70 Moreover, as Aristotle notes, it is
also true that "what happens to goods also happens to
money" -- that is to say, money is not consistant in
its representation of value. 71
Although Aristotle concludes that money "tells us
how many shoes are equal to a house or to a given
quantity of food" 72 — there is a critical problem.
Establishing a measure cannot itself create
68 Aristotle, Ethics, 1133al9
.
69 The Greek work for
nomisma and is derived
"law" or "convention."
money, or currency
from the same root
coin is
as nomos
70 Aristotle, Ethics, 1133a30-l
.
71 Aristotle, Ethics, 1133al9-20, 1133b8--14 .
72 Aristotle, Ethics
,
1133a23-26
.
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commensurability between objects that are
incommensurable; indeed, measure requires that a
relation between objects has already been
established. Money, precisely because of its
serviceable autonomy, is not in any way essentially
linked to that which it must measure.
In terms of Aristotle’s categories, money, as the
expression of exchange value and as the initial
corrective to the problem of rendering objects
"comparable," is inadequate to such a task because it
ultimately can not be brought into equalized accord
with the objects themselves: again, because qualities
can not be relations nor can they be quantities, and
visa versa.
Because of the quantity/quality lacuna, it is
consequently impossible for money, an autonomous form
of quantitative measure, to solve the problem of
incommensurability. The initial problem posed by the
commensurability/incommensurabilty dichotomy is
reproduced in the "solution" which money provides: the
objects can now be quantified (and hence equalized).
73 That is, there is no difference in this sense
between equating two cabbages with a shoe, or two
cabbages with a coin. Or as Meikle phrases it, "A
measure does not create the property in things which it
measures." (Aristotle's Economic Thought, p. 23 and
passim )
.
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but there is no necessary connection between the
quantitativity of money and the qualitative essence of
the objects themselves. The problem of
commensurability is thus only shifted to a second
level
.
That such a solution merely displaces the problem
appears to be borne out when, in an effort to
articulate the two disparate categories of quality and
quantity, Aristotle introduces "need" ( chreia
)
into the
narrative
.
74
Money, as Aristotle now offers, is the
quantitative representative of a qualitative element —
need. This has evolved, he tells us, by way of
"general agreement." 75 However, the fundamental
difficulty of reconciling the quantitative and
qualitative elements is again reproduced: because it is
lodged in the qualitative realm of use, although "need"
emerges as a basis for things to be measurable in, it
74 Aristotle, Ethics, 1133b20-21. Meikle warns
against translating chreia as demand (a mistake which
Rackham, for one, makes) . As Meikle reminds us,
"demand," together with "supply" has no Greek
equivalent. Meikle writes that demand "is now a
theory-laden term carrying a weight of suggestion that
can not be attributed to a Greek author. The use of
’demand' might also suggest falsely that a modern
subjective or utility form of value might be attributed
to Aristotle." (Aristotle's Economic Thought, p. 23,
nt . 19)
.
75 Aristotle, Ethics, 1133a30.
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As such, it does not
itself lacks a unit of measure.
possess the compound essence necessary to making
objects commensurable.
lo summarize, the two elements, quantity and
quality, form the core -- and the limit -- of the
commensurability problem in the Ethics
. As occupying
the category of the qualitative, "need" can not
establish the basis for quantitative measure necessary
for rendering the unequal equal. Money, coterminously,
is both necessarily -- and dangerously -- autonomous.
At the close of Aristotle's account of exchange in
chapter five, this lacuna -- and thus the
commensurability problem — remains. This
unbroachability is reflected in the peculiar ending of
the chapter. After posing an ostensive solution via
the combination of money and need, Aristotle informs us
that
Clearly, this is the way in which exchange took
place before the existence of money, for it makes
no difference whether five beds or the money value
of five beds is the equivalent of a house. 76
We are thus returned to the very beginning of the
inquiry. In other words, "proportionate reciprocity,"
as founded on the fundamental incommensurability of
76 Aristotle, Ethics, 1133b25-30.
33
accuracy
objects, forecloses the possibility of strict
m restitution which would draw commercial exchange
into a more explicit relation with corrective justice.
A persistent tension runs between the imperative
of particular justice as to ison, which posits that one
leaves the transaction with what one had when one
entered it ("one's own"), and the unsteady outcome of
Aristotle's discussion, which poses an imprecise
adequation" between objects through human need
(chreia)
.
This tension between an ideal equality and
the inequality which is both contained in, and
generated by, the exchange transaction is implicated in
Aristotle account of the relation of fair commercial
exchange as the "bond" which holds together the
koinonia
We noted above the integral bond mentioned by
Aristotle in regard to the importance of fair exchange
to political community. In the first portion of the
chapter we were told that the just, as the "equal,
"
establishes a bond "which holds the association
together." 7 As we saw, the critical import of
commensurability lies here, in that it holds the
promise of an equalization of difference which is
measurable, and somehow exact, even though it does not
77 Aristotle, Ethics, 1133a2.
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same." The
return the Pythagorean literality of the "
point of establishing commensurability was to eliminate
the "two part" excessive (quantitative) remainder of
the transaction which can accrue to one of the two
participants. In chapter five however, there is a
second context in which a communal bond is mentioned.
The second form is introduced soon after the
initial introduction of money, at the point where
Aristotle acknowledges the "impossibility" of formal
commensurability. 78 It is at this juncture, as we will
recall, that need ( chreia
)
is interjected into the
account as a way of augmenting the quantitativity of
the money form. Need, as purportedly inserting a
dimension of comparison, renders the exchange
transaction hiksnos
,
translatable as "adequate" or
"sufficient." 79 The positioning of "need" in this
final attempt to forge an accommodation between the
exchangeable objects, is significant -- for, as
Aristotle seems to be suggesting, it itself is
productive of a bond. Aristotle has already told us
that "if men were to require nothing, or were to
78 "Now of course it is impossible that things
differing so greatly from one another should in reality
become commensurable." (Ethics, 1133bl9-20)
.
79 Ostwald and Rackham, respectively.
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require things equally, there would be no exchange or
not the same kind of exchange." 80 And, a few passages
later adding.
T1
2
a
^K
it is need which hold the parties together as
It
were one single unit is shown by the facttnat there is no exchange when one or both partiesdo not stand in need of the other. 81
The proximity between the role of need, on one
hand, and the failed goal of equalization and
commensurability on the other, poses a dramatic
contrast to the first version of the communal
imperative of cohesion as linked to isonomia. The
absense of a formal solution to the problem of
commensurability reveals, as we noted, an excessive
remainder produced by the exchange transaction. This
remainder, as Aristotle’s impasse suggests, is not
readily effaced. By the conclusion of the chapter this
remainder, and the injustice it signifies, emerges as a
potential nexus of the communal bond. The outcome of
Aristotle's account of the transaction, as framed
within these two critical contexts of communal
cohesion, point toward two sets of implications.
First, the category of "need" is functionally
implicated in the apparently intractable condition of
80 Aristotle, Ethics, 1133a27-30.
81 Aristotle, Ethics, 1133b7-ll.
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incommensurability; however, as a socio-political bond,
need gives rise to an imprecise reciprocity that is yet
constituted by the structural imprecision it manifests.
The very constitution of the polis itself is drawn into
a dangerous proximity with the excessive remainder of
exchange, notwithstanding Aristotle's exertions. To
press this line of suggestion one step further, a
question can be posed: might the effort to equalize, as
the attempt to efface any excessive remainder of
exchange, be somehow disruptive to the second bond
implicated by Aristotle with regard to the exchange
relation? Although Aristotle has reached an impasse,
he has uncovered a most provocative circumstance.
B. Aristotle: The Politics
In the Politics, Aristotle's analysis of exchange
shifts from an undifferentiated mode of exchange to an
analysis based upon differentiating types of exchange
as either "natural" or "unnatural." Here, exchange is
presented as a form of acquisition {chremistike)
,
a
term which can refer both to an activity of the
household and the polis. As noted by Barker,
chrematistike is deployed in three different ways in
the Politics: first, as the art of acquisition
generally, in forms both "natural" and "unnatural";
37
secondly, as the unnatural forms through which
individual gain is accrued; and third, as "necessary"
and "natural" forms of acquisition. 82
In the Politics Aristotle, roots the practice of
exchange m the idea of sufficiency, or autarkes, the
condition of "having enough" 83 — far less demanding, as
it would seem, than the onus associated with the to
ison. Although autarkes may generally evoke the
perception of a simple satiety reminiscent of the "city
of pigs" in Plato's Republic, to "have enough" within
the context of the political association is to possess
not merely "enough" for mere life (zoe), but yet
something more. ' For although the state originates in
the act of acquiring the rudimentary needs of life, it
continues for the sake of the "good life" (to eu
zen) , 84 To partake in the "good life" is to practice
82 Ernest Barker, The Politics of Aristotle (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 22, nt . E. Although
chremistike is the most commonly used term, lambanein,
the antithesis of give, which can alternately mean
"get," "take" or "receive," is occasionally used.
Unless otherwise indicated, excerpts of the Politics
are taken from Barker's translation.
83 Although in some contexts translated as
"independence of other," the most common usage of this
term in the writings of Aristotle is "having enough."
84 To eu zen can also be translated as "flourishing."
As Aristotle tells us in the second chapter of Book I,
"When we come to the final and perfect association,
formed from a number of villages, we have already
reached the polis -- an association which may be said
to have reached the height of full self-sufficiency; or
rather, we may say while it grows for the sake of mere
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goodness (eudaimonia)
,
a practice only open to those
who are freed from necessity. 85 The "good life" thus
requires a form of a "contained abundance" -- released
from the constraints of, but supported by, natural
abundance - in order to allow the independent pursuit
of politics for its own sake and not in the spirit of
gain (pleonexia
)
,
86 The end of the "art" of
life [and is at that stage, still short of full self-Suf ficrency]
,
it exists [once fully grown] for the sakeof the good life [and is fully self-sufficient]
.
85 As Barker writes of the social strata of theGreeks: "Apart from the depressed class of household
s aves (douloi) and that of serfs or dependents tied tothe soil, (...generally designated as perioikoi)
, therewere two mam strata. The upper is called by various
names m the course of the Politics.
. . numerically,(this group) is 'the few' {oligoi) ; economically, it isthe wealthy' (plousioi) or 'the possessing' class: inpoint of culture and prestige, it is 'the better' orthe best' ( beltiones or aristoi)
,
or again it is 'the
notables' (gnorimoi)
,
or it is 'the reasonable andfair (epieikeis) who make up the better sort, or it is
'the men who are reasonable and fair and
leisure.' The other class has a variety
but all are by their nature 'unleisured'
spending their days in a cycle of 'toil'
relaxation
(ponos and anapausi s) , and having no
opportunity for leisure." (The Politics of Aristotle,[New York: Oxford University Press, 1946], pp. lxxiii-
lxiv)
. Compare to Plato, Laws
,
807c-e regarding the
detriment of engaging in a "multitude of little trivial
directions about household arrangements." Pericles, as
Plutarch tells us in his Lives, relegated the
administration of all the economic affairs of the
household to a single servant, Evangelus.
able to enjoy
of names,
( ascholoi
)
,
and
86 Thus, wealth, in its proper and limited form, is
closely related to the notion of "sufficiency." It is
contained likewise in the definition of wealth
( kouros ) . Other terms for wealth include ploytos or
ktesis. The ambiguous nature of the capacities and
potentialities of wealth are found in the fifth
century Anonymus Jamblichi
,
which ascribes the impulse
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acquisition is thus a "supply of objects," which are
'necessary for (the good) life" and "useful to the
association of the polis or the household." 87
The point of departure for Aristotle is Solon's
commonly circulated adage: "But of riches no bound has
been fixed or revealed to men." Rather, as Aristotle
rejoins,
^ liroit has been fixed, as with the other arts,
since no tool belonging to any art is without alimit whether in number or size, and riches are a
collection of tools for the householder and the
statesman. 88
toward wealth to "fear of common contingencies,
sickness, old age and sudden loss of possessions and
the desire to outdo others, ambition emulation and the
desire to acquire positions of power." (Quoted in
Singer, Oikonomia, p. 41).
87 Politics, 1256b30-34
. "Wealth as a whole, consists
in using things rather than owning them; it is really
the activity -- that is, the use — of the property
that constitutes wealth." ( Rhetoric
,
trans. John Henry
Freese [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 19671,
1361a23ff )
.
88 Politics, 1256a34ff (Rackham)
. Approaches to this
issue are manifold: Plato in one instance defines
proper wealth as "true" wealth ( athenos ) in non-
material qualities -- the possession of the immaterial
goods of wisdom and virtue. ( Symposium iii 8 and iv 33-
44). See also the discussion of wealth in the Pseudo-
Platonic Eryxias. In a another tack, the definition of
"proper" wealth is redrawn to signify the prepolitical
condition. As Solon writes, "Surely equal is the
wealth of him that hath much silver and gold and fields
of wheatland and horses and mules, to him that hath but
this -- comfort in belly and sides and feet." ( Elegy
and Iambus, Vol. I, trans. J.M. Edmonds [New York, G.P.
Putnam's Son's, 1931], Frag. 24). Or, as Herodotus
40
Here, Aristotle broadly echoes the customary Greek
treatment of wealth, which categorically asserts use as
the limit to acquisition — but he approaches this
position, however, by identifying the specific modes of
acquisition
( chremistike ) which will express the limits
designated by nature which are represented by use. 89
For Aristotle, use represents a fundamental form of
measure and limit because nature — as opposed to
techne — fashions nothing without a limit or
purpose
.
90
writes, "The very wealthy is no better off than he whohas sufficient for the day." ( Histories
,
i, 32). The
ambiguity between limit, measure and surplus is
suggested by Xenophon when he writes of "increasing the
estate by showing a balance {periousia ) .
"
(Oikonomikos, 14, in Works, ed. E.C. Marchant [New
York: Oxford University Press, 1947)
.
89 In both pre-classical and classical Greek
literature the excessive attributes of wealth are
commonly contained by an association with an extremely
amorphous sense of "use." For example, as we are told
by Xenophon, wealth is that which consists of
"serviceable things." Or, elsewhere, wealth is
"whatever is useful to life" and "useful," in turn, is
tautologically defined as "everything that anyone knows
how to use." ( Oikonomikos , ii. 2-8, iv 33-44, vi 4).
Xenophon uses the term chremata to signify the "excess
of goods over needs," chremata itself receiving no
further elaboration. The definition of proper wealth
through use also appears in Aristotle’s Rhetoric: "In
a word, being wealthy consists rather in use than in
possession, for the actualization and use of such
things is wealth." (Rhetoric, 1361a23ff)
.
90 Cf. Politics, 1253al0. Nature may be understood in
two ways; first, in terms of natural objects which
serve larger purposes, and secondly, that there exists
in the universe an comprehensive order or aim that is
reproduced throughout nature. As Barker tells us, "The
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The first form of chremistike introduced by
Aristotle is represented by occupations dependent on
one’s own labors: herding, farming, piracy, fishing
and hunting. Such acquisition is deemed by Aristotle
to be in conformity with the contained abundance of
"true wealth" (to alethinos ploutos)
,
92 indicating
"goods, capable of accumulation, which are necessary
for (the good) life and useful for the community or
household.
”
93 For Aristotle, the household, or oikos,
serves as a model for "sufficiency," without which
conception of end has come before us in many names, andfrom many aspects. As a ’form’, it represents theshape into which amorphous matter is molded- asNature’ it represents identification with that ideal,towards which all movement is directed. As 'function'
.
-
1 ® that full height of action, to participate in
which constitutes partnership in the body politic whichthe degree of participation is the standard.
. . As
essence’, the end has already presented itself as the
content of definition and the criterion of
classification: as 'limit', we still have to notice, itdetermines the character of its means." (Barker, The
Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle, p. 229 and p269 passim)
.
91 The art of war is considered by Aristotle to be aform of hunting: "hunting ought to be practiced — not
only against wild animals, by also against human beings
who are intended by nature to be ruled by others and
refuse to obey that intention." (Politics, 1256b§ll)
.
92 Aristotle, Politics, 1256b30ff. (Rackham)
93 Aristotle, Politics, 1256b7ff. (Rackham) Aristotle
defines necessity as "anything without which it is
not possible for good to exist or come to be, or for
bad to be discarded, or gotten rid of." (Metaphysics
,
1015a20f f )
.
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there is no possibility for attaining the proper
surplus of "true wealth": a ready stock of useful
things
.
However, as we are told "there is another kind of
acquisition that is specifically called wealth-getting
( chrematiske) ... and to this kind it is due that there
is thought to be no limit to riches and property." 94 a
Aristotle continues,
There are many who hold this second form of the
art to be identical with the other form, previously
mentioned, because it has affinities with it. Infact it is not identical, and yet it is not far
removed. The other form previously mentioned is
natural, this second form is not natural, but
rather the product of a certain sort of experience
and skill (techne)
. . ,
95
The task of demarcating the natural form from the
unnatural is one which takes up the unsolved problem of
incommensurability in an alternative way. The
qualitative/quantitative antinomy that appeared in the
Ethics prefigures the central dualism undergirding the
discussion in the Politics: value-in-use and value-in-
exchange. Here, Aristotle attempts to find specific
forms of exchange which are themselves inherently
commensurable . It is important to note putatively that
the qualitative element of exchange is in all cases
94 Aristotle, Politics
,
1256b40ff. (Rackham)
95 Aristotle, Politics, 1257a4ff. (Rackham)
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as opposed to the
lodged in the objects transacted
subjects transacting, as was the case in the example of
chreia.
Aristotle ascribes to all objects which occupy the
field of human intercourse a two-fold character:
nlh ° f Pr0Perty have two possible uses° f t
a
ese uses belon9 to the article as suchd° n
°!l
belong t0 it ln the same manner 'or
pecSLr to t^
entl The °ne USe 18 P r°Per “d
not i
a 0 h artlcle concerned; the other is
The proper and "particular" use of an object is thus in
accord with the qualitative nature of the object,
rendering it suitable to a single purpose. 97 To use an
object in this way thus allows the subject to be
directed by the object's essential nature. The second
"use," however, refers to each object's ability to be
exchanged. A shoe, for example, can be used for "its
wear as a shoe" and "its use as an article of exchange
{metabletike ) ; for both are ways of using a shoe." 99
Although exchange thus is a use which "belongs to the
article as such, " it is yet not specific or endemic to
the article concerned. As he continues,
96 Aristotle, Politics, 1257a6-10.
97 Aristotle, Politics, 1257a2-3. And, as Aristotle
tells us, "for whoever produces something produces it
for an end." ( Ethics , 113 9b 1 — 3 )
.
98 Aristotle, Politics, 1257a2.
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All articles of property, we are told, possess this
dual capacity: "Exchange is possible in regard to them
all: it arises from the natural facts of the case, and
this is due to some men having more, and some less,
than suffice for their needs." 100
Exchange, absent from the first form of
chremistike, is now to be traced in successive forms.
The first, barter, is a "proper" form of exchange —
yet apparently suitable only to pre-political tribal
forms. Such associations, barter, we are told, is a
"proper" form of exchange "for such tribes do not go
beyond exchanging
( allage ) actual commodities for
actual commodities" 101 — a form of exchange carried out
only "to the extent that sufficed for the needs of both
parties." 10 " This mode of acquisition is not contrary
99 Aristotle, Politics
,
1257a2
.
100 Aristotle, Politics, 1257a4
.
101 Aristotle, Politics, 1257a24ff. (Rackham)
102 Aristotle, Politics, 1257a§4. Rackham 1 s
translation reads "for it existed for the replenishment
of natural self-sufficiency (autarkeias ) ."
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to nature, and yet, as Aristotle tells us,
this that the "art of business" as a means
getting" in due course arose. 103
it is from
of "wealth-
The next stage involves the shift from barter to
exchange mediated by coinage, facilitated, according
to Aristotle's account, by trade over distance. 104 We
are told that initially money functioned as a "measure"
which served to merely represent material wealth. 105 it
was thus from this "necessary" innovation, that
"unnatural" forms of exchange were to emerge. Exchange
eventually became "more highly organized as experience
discovered the sources and methods ( technikoteron
) of
exchange that would cause most profit." 106 Although in
this instance profit is cited as a function of method,
the problem in fact arises from certain structural
aspects of the exchange form itself, as freed from the
barter form. As "the first element of commerce," money
poses a singular problem: unlike the "natural" and
limited forms of acquisition, the "riches" created
"are truly unlimited." 107 The boundlessness of this
form of exchange lies in the fact that money allows
103 Aristotle, Politics
104 Aristotle, Politics
105 Aristotle, Politics
106 Aristotle, Politics
107 Aristotle, Politics
1257a30ff. (Rackham)
1257a33ff. (Rackham)
1257a39
.
1257b4ff. (Rackham)
1257b28
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each object to take on extrinsic characteristic
independent of the object represented, distancing it
from the natural limit of use. Value-in-exchange, as
represented by money, does not possess an inherent
limit, unlike the material object which pronounces its
own end in the act of use. Money, as Aristotle tells
US, is thus both the means ("the starting point") and
the end of retail exchange (kapelike), the act of
buying in order to sell.
Aristotle's definition of money as either a
measure or as a force which effaces the proper ends of
the objects themselves; therefore yield two general
types of exchange transactions. 108 First, as a gainful
act ( kapelike
)
whereby exchange is undertaken to the
end of an increase of money; and secondly, the natural
or proper acquisition for which "money was intended to
be used." 109
Despite the differences between natural exchange
(metablike) and unnatural exchange {kapelike)
,
Aristotle remarks that there is yet a "close
affinity" 110 (epallattei) between the two forms, an
108 In this regard, see Aristotle's remarks as to the
Delphic knife, which as made for the purpose not of
use, but for a gainful exchange, is created in a
"spirit of stint." (Politics, 1252b3)
.
109 Aristotle, Politics, 1258b8.
110 (Rackham)
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affinity attributable to the monetary medium deployed
in both instances. Consequently, as Aristotle tells us
They overlap
( epallattei
)
because they are bothhandlrug the same objects and acting in the same
lines
° f
?S
qU1
K
ltl0n; but they move along different
--the object of the one being simple
deferent!- '
^ that ° f the °ther some?hing quite
In both cases, the vehicle is the same; however, the
two ends, detrimental and beneficial, can not be
clearly distinguished from one another. However,
Aristotle does, in fact, discern quite clearly two
types of wholly unambiguous transactions: barter, which
excludes the money form, and usury
( obolostatke
)
an
unmediated exchange of money for money — "the breeding
of money from money." 112
In concluding his analysis of exchange forms,
Aristotle is not only unable to maintain a fundamental
distinction between money usages, but his conclusion
confirms the suspicion which he set out to annul:
"There are many who hold this second form of the art
111 Aristotle, Politics, 1257b§55.
112 Aristotle, Politics
,
1258b5. "For money was
intended to be used in exchange, but not to increase at
interest.... And this term interest {tokos) which means
the birth of money from money, is applied to money
because the offspring resembles the parent. Wherefore
of all the modes of getting wealth this is the most
unnatural." (Politics, 1258bl-8, 1258a37)
.
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(unnatural) to be identical with the other form
(natural)...m fact it is not identical, and yet it is
not far removed." 113
C. Exchange and Political Community
As posed m the Ethics
, strict commensurability
between objects of exchange can not be established, and
proper exchange forms can not be clearly demarcated
from improper forms in the Politics. Troubling
implications thus ensue not only for the ideal of
justice as a form of isonomia, but for the very
constitution of the polis. The outcome of Aristotle's
discussions of exchange points to the excess produced
by the exchange relation, an excess conferring gain
( both excesses ) upon one of the two participants in
the transaction. The implication of Aristotle's
analysis is that such one-sided accretion can no longer
be simply be an issue of the adventitious trader who
practices a particular mode of techne. Because the
unlimited essence of exchange-value can infect any
money-mediated transaction, the intent to gain from
another can not be clearly separated from the formal
(monetary) means through which the exchange relation is
executed. For this reason, the transaction of both the
113 Aristotle, Politics, 157a§l.
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surreptitious
citizen and the trader traverse the
margin by which exchange can generate a gain incurred
"at the expense of another." 11 * This indeterminate
realm of advantaging and mutuality is evoked in Book
Eight of the Ethics:
Travelers.
. ..associate together for some advantaae
( sumpheronti
) , namely to procure some of theirnecessary suppiies But the political association0°' it 1S believed, was originally formed, andcontinues to be maintained, for the (general)
advantage
( sumpherontos ) of its members. 115
In this passage, the organization of the polis appears
to be based upon the notion of "advantage"
( supheronti
)
represented in both singular and mutual terms. 116 As
such, there exists an ambiguity between that advantage
which is individual and that which is common. It would
114 The sizable stakes involved in keeping the two
elements clearly separated is expressed in the fact
that in classical Athens, trade was an occupation which
was widely held by non-citizens (metics)
. In the
secondary literature it is common to only attribute
this separation to the lack of esteem accorded to
trading, as simply grouped with mechanical work. See
for example, Augustus Boeckh, The Public Economy of the
Athenians
,
trans. Anthony Lamb (Boston: Little, Brown &
Company, 1857) . For a general discussion of the
metics
,
see P. Gauthier, Symbola. Les etrangers et lajustice dans les cites grecques (Nancy: 1972); and with
regard to Aristotle, J. Pecirka, "A Note on Aristotle's
Conception of Citizenship and the role of Foreigners in
4th C. Athens," Eirene 6 (1967).
115 Aristotle, Ethics, 1160a. (Rackham)
116 The term can also signify "profitably" or "with
expediency." (H.G. Liddell and Robert Scott, A Greek-
English Lexicon [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940], s.v.
"sumpherontos")
.
50
here be useful to remark upon the more subtle
characterizations of the relationship between
individual and mutual forms of "advantage" as found in
Plato’s Republic, a work in which the question of
advantage is pivotal. 117
Political society, as Plato tells us, finds its
inception in the fundamental needs of human beings, and
it is the particular function of exchange to fulfill
such needs. 11 - in this account we find the following
fascinating determination: "If one man gives another
what he has to give in exchange
( metadosis
)
for what he
can get, it is because each finds that to do so is for
his own advantage." 119 The word for "advantage" is
derived in this translation by Barker from ameinon.
117 Advantage" is commonly rendered in the Republic
as pi eonexia -- a term capturing the essence of Plato'sdefinitions of injustice. Derived from to pleon or
too much," pleonexia is to "exceed one's rightful
sphere or function." The term means literally, "tohave or gain some advantage over another," "to have or
take more than another" or to "claim more than is one'sdue. (Liddell and Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon,
s.v. "pleonexia")
.
118 My notion is, said I, that a state comes into
existence because no individual is self-sufficing; we
all have many needs... So, having all these needs, we
call in one another's help to satisfy our various
requirements; and when we have collected a number of
helpers and associates to live together in one place,
we call that settlement a state." ( Republic
,
trans.
Paul Shorey, Loeb Classical Library [Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1930], 369c).
119 Plato, Republic, 369c.
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Barker chooses "advantage" over the more literal
meaning of ameinon as "better for, " a translation which
Shorey, for one, employs. The word thus signifies both
the sense of advantage over another as well as a sense
of benefit promoting welfare, as for example in the
benefit conferred by health. 120 This obscurity is
likewise present in the word opheleo which is
alternately used to signify "advantage" or "profit";
yet opheleo can also refer to "the common interest of
dll, benefit" or "aid" -- an ambiguity shrewdly
played upon when Plato uses opheleo in the context of
describing the form of justice that at both "benefits"
friends and harms enemies. 121 The way in which
advantage, as relative advantage, and advantage as
beneficial" or mutual, play off one another is also
found in the encounter with Thrasymachus at the end of
Book I. Here, Plato progressively shifts the meaning
of "advantage" toward the sense of benefit by purging
the self-advantaging (pleonastic) element from the
120 The ambiguity is likewise present in English
usage. Although advantage generally signifies "a
superior position" or "the position of being in advance
or ahead of another." It can also connote "benefit,
enhancement, improvement" or "to increase or augment
the effect of any thing." In the former instance, the
inflection can also be a "pecuniary profit or gain,
interest on money lent"; and, in accord with the root
of pleonexia, "greater quantity or number, 'more-
ness'... overplus, excess." (Oxford English Dictionary,
n.v. "advantage").
121 Plato, Republic 334b.
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definition. In this chapter, advantage which exists
outside of the context of the mutually beneficent
political association is, in the final instance, deemed
fundamentally
"inadvantageous .
"
Such phrasing is especially interesting given the
fact that in the Republic Plato's rudimentary state —
the infamous city of pigs — already includes the
presence of exchange via money forms. There thus
exists an ambiguity with regard to the use of
metadosis
,
for while it means literally "to give a
share"; yet, as positioned in this example, it also
suggests an act of simultaneous and unmediated
transfer. In contrast to Aristotle's genealogy of
acquisitive forms in the Politics, the acquisitive
forms inhabiting the rudimentary state entirely
outstrip their circumscribed context. 122 Indeed, that
Plato is well aware of the dangers which ensue from
these forms is attested to in the Laws, in which
certain forms of trade and coinage are strictly
regulated. 123
This portion of Plato's account in the Republic
approximates the same ambiguity suggested by
Aristotle's discussion in book five of the Ethics. As
we will recall, at the conclusion of Aristotle's
122 Plato, Republic, 371.
123 See for example, Plato, Laws, V 742a.
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account, the problem of commensurability is addressed
in terms of "need” (chreia). Moreover, it is important
to note that the usages of chreia not only include
need, " "use" or even "service" -- but also
"advantage." 124
"Mutuality" here becomes an
doppel ganger, as it were, with the uneasy cohesion
afforded by "advantage" -- or the expectation thereof.
To represent this element contained in need --
both excessive and cohesive — in terms of exchange is
to return to the very raison d'etre of particular
justice as the basis of a series of limits expressly
designed to contain the possibility of taking from
another that which is not "one's own." The entire
problem of "advantage" is perhaps located within what
H.H. Joachim refers to as the "generic identity"
of justice and injustice -- by which both justice and
injustice "issue in actions advantaging or
disadvantaging another." 125
The issue of exchange foregrounds the fundamental
question of the relation between individual gain and
community — the negotiation of the relation between
individual advantage and the "advantage" of others who
124 Liddell and Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, sv.
"chreia .
"
125 Joachim, Nichomachean Ethics, pp. 128 and 130.
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together constitute the political koinonia
. While
exchange is posed as a form of necessity and mutuality,
it nevertheless stands in a mutable, if unstable,
relation to individual gain. The transaction, in
relentless defiance of a strict isonomia, is neither
able to distinguish between need or advantage - while
the "unearned increment" may be conferred nonetheless.
In the end, despite all of Aristotle's exertions,
mutual "gain" is found to be inseparable from
individual advantage. It is here fitting to recall
Aristotle's most favored category of chremistike in the
Politics. Agriculture and hunting, as portrayed in the
Politics
,
are subsumed under a category of acquisition
that is above all distinguished by the absence of
exchange: "Property of this sort then seems to be
bestowed by nature herself upon all." 126 The complexity
of the exchange relation, a relation which,
paradoxically, creates the possibility of both
providing for and gaining from others, explains the
inclusion of both piracy and war in Aristotle's
natural or "proper" category of acquisition. In both
instances the central criterion is met; for both piracy
and war are forms of acquisition which avoid the
questions of fairness and mutuality raised by the
exchange transaction. In this case, "advantage" is
126 Aristotle, Politics,. 1256b8-9.
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decisively conferred — not from nature, but from
those human creatures who exist outside the political
association
.
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CHAPTER II
EARLY MODERN APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM OF EXCHANGE
The pr°fit of one is thQ damagQ Qfanother... No man profitith but by theloss of others. y
Montaigne
A.. Mercantilism: Exchange and Absolute AdvantarrP
Aristotle's analysis of exchange as taken up by
the Canonist doctrine of "just price" does not survive
the accelerating expansion of trade in the late Middle
Ages
. The body of economic thought which was to
arise from this period of commercial expansion is
127 The problem of individual gain which lies at theheart of the issue of the just price is broadly cast intwo forms in the Canonist literature: first, the
stringent attempt to equalize exchange, the pro par
pari, and the attempt to ascertain a minimal form ofprofit to be accrued. In the former instance, all gain
was regarded as suspect, and in the latter, modest
gains were regarded as acceptable. These two positionsbroadly follow the impulses of Ethics, Book V and the
Politics, Book I, respectively. The extent of the
faithful reproduction of the works of Aristotle by the
Canonists, or to what extent their general depictions
reflect my own reading of Aristotle, is not significant
to the broader aim of the task at hand. For a useful
summary of the social-economic factors which gave rise
to mercantilism, see volume I, chapters I-IV of Eli
Heckscher's Mercantilism, trans. Mendel Shapiro
(London: George Allen & Unwin, 1955). Regarding the
formal break between the disciplines of political
economy and political thought which occurred in the
16th century, see Richard Olson, The Emergence of the
Social Sciences (New York: Twayne, 1993)
.
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broadly referred to as mercantilism. 128 Mercantilist
reasoning may be generally summed by the following
tenets: first, that money or treasure constitutes
wealth; and secondly, that foreign trade is the only
means to generate wealth. 129 The often fantastic logics
which emerge within this form of economic thought have
led to a tendency to dismiss mercantilism for
primitive" economic reasoning -- indeed, Schumpeter
employs the word "contempt" when describing this
general perception. 1 Despite this perception, the
128 Regarding the difficulties and abuses associated
with the moniker "mercantilism," see E.G.A. Johnson,
Predecessors of Adam Smith (New York: A.M. Kellev
1937)
,
pp. 3-4 .
129 See for example, M. Beer, Early British Economics
(New York: A.M. Kelley, 1967), pp. 60-61. The degree
to which these faiths are held by all those
historically considered to be mercantilists will not be
treated, given the purpose at hand. To most generally
organize mercantilist thought, I have found Beer’s
division of mercantilism into two periods corresponding
to English history most helpful: from Edward I to Queen
Elizabeth and from the Stuarts to the ascension of the
Hanoverians Beer emphasizes the continuity of the
fundamental idea of drawing "treasure" into the realm,
although methods employed differ: "In the first period
personal monarchy enacted so-called bullionist
ordinances and statutes for that purpose. In the second
period, the merchants attempted to accomplish that aim
by the balance of trade policy." (Early British
Economics, pp. 61-62)
.
130 Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis
,
p. 336.
Beer is less acrimonious. He writes that despite all,
"The mercantilist doctrine must have answered the
interests and logic of its age." (Early British
Economics, p. 62)
.
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mercantilists afford a valuable expression -- or
rather, a series of symptoms — of the problem of gain
resulting from exchange.
Aristotle's analysis of exchange had begun with
the effort to distinguish between the two form of
exchange, the one mutual and fair, the other
adventitious and unequal. Aristotle's efforts reveal
the simultaneous existence of both these elements, but
his efforts to theoretically divide or cordon off the
mutual and necessary aspects from the dangerous ones
are, in the last instance, stymied.
Now, the central implication which attends the
adventitious form of exchange is that quantitative
advantage is conferred to only one of the two
transacting parties. In the Middle Ages, once the
possibility of the ideal of the pro par pari was
yielded, the difficulty involved demarcating the proper
degree of gain -- the determination of a proportionate
"excess," as it were. In mercantilist doctrine,
however, all ambiguities with regard to either
equalization or gain are expelled. Mercantilist
doctrine asserts the possibility of exacting a maximum
monetary advantage from the exchange transaction, an
end the classical world perceived as problematic.
However, the mercantilist reasonings with regard to
monetary advantage may be understood as a maneuver
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which does not so much violate classical thought as it
appears to outflank the Aristotelian problems
associated with exchange. The mercantilists posed a
direct solution for the theoretical, political and
ethical ambiguities of monetary gain: simply phrased,
the unequal or excessive element which emerges from
exchange is to be expelled beyond the limits of the
political association. The new political form which is
to serve as the territorial limit is the nation-
state . 131
Characterized by "precise boundaries, and...
objectives, loyalties, and recognized moral obligations
largely confined to these boundaries" the nation-state
represented a departure from previous European
perspectives influenced by the universalism of
Christian thought. 132 As the first legitimation of
exchange as a means of exacting an unambiguous maximum
of monetary gain from the exchange transaction, the
131 For a good collection of writings on the
relationship between the early forms of the nation-
state and trade relations, see James D. Tracy, ed. The
Political Economy of Merchant Empires: State Power and
World Trade 1350-1750 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1991)
.
132 Jacob Viner, "The Nation-State and Private
Enterprise" in Essays on the Intellectual History of
Economics (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1991), pp. 45-46. As we are told by Beer, "The gradual
abandonment of medieval universalism in commerce and
religion was preceded in philosophy by the abandonment
of the Universals in favor of the Particulars
(nominalism)." (Early British Economics, pp. 73-74).
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mercantilist approach to exchange defines clear lines
of advantage as assumed over rival states. The
founding tenet of mercantilist policy is that it
"should be framed and executed in strictly
nationalistic terms, that is national advantage alone
is to be given weight." 133 In the seventeenth century,
the material form of national advantage complements
133 The nature of this advantage is generally posed inone of two ways in the secondary literature.
Heckscher, following Gustav Schmoller
( The MercantileSystem. [New York: Macmillan, 1910]], argues that the
consolidation of power is the sole form of advantage
sought by the early forms of the nation-state, aposition countered by Viner who emphasizes the equalimportance of material gain. These twin goals areinterrelated by Viner, each a "prerequisite for the
attainment of the other." See his "Power Versus Plenty
as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and
Eighteenth Centuries" and "The Nation State and Private
Enterprise" in Essays on the Intellectual History of
Economics (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1991) . It is of interest to compare this conception of
the nation state with the characterization of the
medieval town, which, as Schmoller writes, was a self-
sufficient economic organism: "each town, and
especially each of the larger towns, seeks to shut
itself up to itself as an economic whole, and, at the
same time, in its relation to the outside world, to
extend the sphere of its influence, both economic and
political, as far as possible... "market-rights, toll-
rights and mile-rights (Meilenrecht ) are the weapons by
which the town creates for itself both revenue and
municipal policy... The soul of that policy is the
putting of fellow citizens at an advantage, and of
competitors from outside at a disadvantage." As
Schmoller adds, the old constitution of the village
"must be broken up by the creation of great states and
by other forces, before another and higher development
of economic life can make its appearance." (The
Mercantile System, p. 6). Heinrich Kleist's "Michael
Kohlhaas," a short story set within this historical
period, will be the subject of a forthcoming essay on
the issues associated with the symbolic and material
transactivity of exchange.
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that of political advantage: both forms were conceived
as operating on the principal of zero-sum gain. 134
Commerce here mirrors the strictures of foreign policy
for which there exists a fixed quantity of not only
political
,
but economic resources; 135 as the
mercantilist Francis Bacon writes, "whatsoever is
somewhere gotten is somewhere lost" and "what one
gains, the other loses." 136
Profits from commercial trade, as Thomas Mun tells
us, are measured by the amount the sale exceeds the
purchase and this difference in price is paid by the
134 Viner attempts to distinguish the two usages ofdifferential gain in a highly germane way: "In the
field of power it is correct to say that power is
relative, not absolute, and that therefore what A gains
in power must be at the expense of some B. In the field
of wealth, it is not correct to hold that wealth is
static or has some definitely prescribed limits, and it
is not correct to say that one man's or one country's
gain must be another man's or country's loss. But one
country's gain can be, may be another country's
loss... By capturing booty in war, by piracy, by
monopolizing trade routes... by monopolizing by force
against potential rivals an export market or a source
of valuable imports, it was wholly possible in theory
and to some extent realizable in practice for a
country by use of its power to enrich itself through
impoverishing another country or countries." ( Essays on
the Intellectual History of Economics, p. 47) .
135 "Scarcely any other element in mercantilist
philosophy contributed more to the shaping of economic
policy, and foreign policy as a whole." (Mercantilism,
Vol . II, p. 24)
.
136 Francis Bacon, Essays, no. 15, "Of Seditions and
Troubles"; Montchretien, Traicte de l'Oeconomie
politique. (Quoted in Heckscher, vol. II, p. 26).
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foreign consumer. i: As exchange in the form of
foreign trade is the "ordinary means of national
increase," Mun advises that this increase is brought
about by a favorable balance of trade. According to
Mun, "we must ever observe this rule: to sell more to
strangers yearly than we consume of theirs in value,
"
for it is only the "treasure which is brought into the
Realm by the balance of our foreign trade" which
constitutes the amount "by which we are enriched." 138
As Heckscher notes, this demand for an export surplus
was expressed by the mercantilists "in every possible
way. " 139
In mercantilist thought, the difficulties
associated with the classical understanding of exchange
are not directly solved but, rather, they are shifted,
insofar as the surplus which now accrues is exacted not
from within the political community
. Here is Jean-
Baptist Colbert in a letter to a King:
It is not possible to increase [the stock of one
country] by 20, 30 or 50 million without at the
same time taking the same quantity from neighboring
states. Thus arises this twofold increase
(elevation)
,
which has been so clearly discernable
137 Thomas Mun, England's Treasure by Foreign Trade
[1664] (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1965), p. 21.
138 Mun, England's Treasure by Foreign Trade, p. 21.
On the balance of trade, also see Beer, Early British
Economics
,
chapter VIII.
139 Heckscher, Mercantilism, vol. II, p. 116.
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for several years past: on the one hand the powerand greatness of Your Majesty increases, on theother that of your enemies and ill-wishers falls 14 0
Or, as Francis Bacon phrases it, "It is likewise to be
remembered that the increase of any Estate must be
upon the Foreigner." 141
The constitution of domestic exchange in much of
mercantilist thought follows a complementary logic in
accord with the principle tenets attributed to foreign
exchange. Because the calculation of gain or loss is
asserted only in terms of the state as an aggregate
form, the problem of domestic individual gain or loss
is absorbed, or rather, neutralized. As Mun tells us,
because "the gain of one subject is the loss of
another" exchanges in the home market are simply
"unprofitable." 142 Alongside this position, which
posits wealth as a "vibration" between transactors, is
another, in which domestic trade is cast as a means to
a maintenance of individuals. As F.W. von Schrotter
writes, domestic trade makes people happy, but not
140 Colbert, Lettres VI, quoted in Heckscher, vol. II,
p. 27.
141 Francis Bacon, Essays, "Of Seditions and Troubles"
(New York: C.S. Francis & Co., 1857). Most polished of
this static conception is offered by Colbert, who, as
Heckscher writes, "applied the conception in practice
in a most ominous manner." (Mercantilism , pp. 26-27).
142 Mun, England's Treasure by Foreign Trade, ch. 14.
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rich; and as Mathias de Saint-Jean tells us, foreign
trade "fattens the natives while domestic trade only
provides for sustenance." 143
The mercantilist displacement of the excessive
elements of exchange is, paradoxically, filtered
through a group traditionally regarded in an ambiguous
light -- the merchant traders. In the mercantilist
epoch the status of the merchant was elevated to a new
level. Praises of merchants now scale dazzling
heights, most notably in the writings of Mun. Mun,
himself a merchant, writes of merchants as "stewards of
the stock of the kingdom, " and, as the "principal
Agent (s) in this great business" of increasing national
wealth, the merchant is an ideal counsel to the
sovereign. 144 As one commentator has suggested, given
Mun’s general description, the merchant would be the
ideal citizen. 145 Such sentiments were not uniformly
held. If Mun is the most effusive in his praise of the
merchant, Gerald Malynes is the most critical, arguing
that because trade is based upon the self-interest of
143 Both quoted in Heckscher, Mercantilism, vol. II,
p. 193.
144 Mun, England's Treasure by Foreign Trade, pp. 2-6.
145 E.G.A. Johnson, Predecessors of Adam Smith (New
York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1965), p. 78.
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merchants, it must be regulated by government to ensure
the general benefit. 1 ' 6 The mercantilist scope of
inquiry, as organized around the aggregation of the
nation-state, suggests that individual domestic
exchange as merely a "vibration of wealth" between
transacting parties, does not, or rather, can not,
constitute a relevant and thereby detrimental form of
internal gain. Aristotle's ambiguity with regard to
exchange is here avoided if often in a specious way.
B. The Eclipse of Exchange: The Physiocrats
Mercantilist thought affords a calculation of
advantage which negates prior notions of individual
gain by shifting the focus of the exchange transaction
from individuals within states to international
commercial transactions. This, and not the familiar
emphasis in the literature of Smithean and post-
Smithean political economy which emphasizes limitations
to free-trade, is the central significance of the
mercantilists to the task at hand. Mercantilism,
however, was to be last expression of the classical
understanding of gain as accrued solely through the
exchange transaction. The inauguration of classical
political economy in the eighteenth-century is marked
146 See Beer, Early British Economics
, pp. 106-110.
66
by the rejection of this assumption — replacing
exchange as the theoretical pivot with the notion of
production. 1 * 1
Although the idea of production, as the
fabrication or creation of objects, is longstanding, 148
^ln.
AS M* rVriteS ' IBefore the Physiocrats, surplus-a ue_ that as
'
profit in the form of profit — wasexplained purely from exchange
,
the sale of the
commodity above its value.” ( Theories of Surplus Value[Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1963], p. 54). And as
^
R<
l
1 writes
'
the problem of price and value washitherto conceived almost exclusively in terms of
exchange. With Aristotle and the Schoolmen it had beenpart of the problem of justice... In the mercantilist
era both the question and answer were different. With
all the obscurities and individual variations, a common
approach underlay mercantilist theory on the question
o price. The approach was that of the merchant. Whatis the best means for making the country rich? Because
wealth is the same as commercial capital (representedby money) the answer is, by making profitable sales.
Profit can only arise upon alienation, i.e. in the act
of exchange, when the seller sells more dearly than he
has bought. All the mercantilist conclusions relating
to foreign trade and their limited and distorted view
of the relation between money and prices are the
results of this approach." (Eric Roll, A History of
Economic Thought, p. 99.)
148 As the role of exchange was emphasized by the
mercantilists, the role of production was diminished
when not presented as merely a means to the end of
exchange: "The more a manufacture causes money to pass
from one hand to another (which we call exchange) the
more useful it is to the country." (F.W. von Schrotter,
as quoted in Heckscher, Mercantilism
,
vol. II, p. 208) .
Production was even in some instances regarded as an
impediment to the economic process. Not only, as
Schrotter tells us, should money "always remain in
circulation" but "neither should it pass into such
manufacture where it is immediately destroyed and not
brought back into use." (Heckscher, Mercantilism vol.
II, p. 208). Here the assumption is that manufacture
does not produce, but to the contrary, somehow consumes
money by stripping away its exchange-value, thereby
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the central point of origin for classical political
economic thought was the elevation of this concept into
a central analytical position. 149 Production as the
center of economic analysis signified the end of a
perception of a world of finite economic goods in which
the gain of one was the loss of another; here the
limits of a zero-sum economics as well as the finite
stasis represented by a "neutral" transfer of domestic
wealth from person to person, could potentially be
creating an absolute use-value by which this form of
consumption' annihilates the object. Mun's position,
though less extreme, is likewise an example of this
impulse, as he argues that a nation can increase its
wealth if money is regularly converted into goods and
if these commodities are transformed back into money.
( England's Treasure by Foreign Trade
,
p. 23) . This
preference for exchange, as represented in and confused
with its nominal money form, over manufacture as the
source of gain is found in another aspect of
mercantilist literature. This is, as Heckscher calls
it, a "fear of goods," the "nearly compulsive" concern
with selling which characterized mercantilist thought.
As Johann Joachim Becker writes, "it is always better
to sell goods to others than to buy goods from others,
for the former brings a certain advantage and the
latter inevitable damage." (Quoted in Heckscher,
Mercantilism, vol. II, p. 116). Finally, it is
fascinating to note the mercantilist preoccupation
with alchemy, a "science" which held the promise of the
"production" of the source of nominal wealth -- gold.
Becker and Schrotter themselves number among the group
that regarded this means as a desirable possibility for
the acquisition of bullion.
149 Gianni Vaggi writes, "The idea that trade cannot
originate wealth had never been proposed before
Quesnay; not even by authors like Cantillon, who were
not Mercantilists and who never particularly stressed
the influence of trade on the welfare of nations." (The
Economics of Frangois Quesnay [Durham: Duke University
Press, 1987]
,
p. 43)
.
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overcome. The very nature of gain thus stood to be
recast given the possibility of the creation of real
wealth. 15 Conterminously, this suggests that goods
need not be sold above their value in order for a
profit to be accrued. 151
The turn into the classical phase of modern
political economy and its emphasis on production -- an
emphasis which will remain until the inception of
"neoclassical" marginal-utility theory in the late 19th
century -- originates at the hands of the French
physiocrats. Frangois Quesnay's Tableau Economique,
marks this turn. The Tableau Economique
,
the first
representation of the economic domain as a whole, is
organized around the separation of two processes -- the
150 Cf. Schumpeter ' s discussion of the Physiocrats and
Quesnay in History of Economic Analysis
.
151 The assumption of commodities as sold at their
"real” value is, for example, mandatory to the Marxian
explanation of profit. As Maurice Dobbs writes, "Gains
of chance or of individual 'sharp-practice’ could exert
no permanent influence in a regime of 'normal
values'... at most this could explain individual gains
and losses among the class of capitalists." ("Classical
Political Economy and Marx, " in Marx and Modern
Economics, ed. David Horowitz, [New York: MacGibbon &
Kee, 1968]
,
pp. 52-53) .
152 Alfred Marshall writes that the physiocrats
represent "the first systematic attempt to form an
economic science." ( Principles of Economics [1890]
[London: Macmillan, 1972], p. 625). See also, J.R.
McCulloch, Principles of Political Economy [1825]
(London: John Murray, 1870)
,
p. 30, and Schumpeter,
History of Economic Analysis
, pp. 242-30.
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and exchange, which
production of the "annual produce"
is pursued in a supplementary stage as "circulation."
According to the physiocrats, production does not
revolve around the process of manufacture; "Industrial
work as Quesnay avers, "does not increase wealth." 153
As we are told, the "artisan destroys in the form of
subsistence as much as he produces by his labour." 154
The starting point of the physiocrats’ emphasis on
production poses the source of all gain instead in the
fundamental fecundity of agriculture: "land is the
unique source of wealth, and... it is agriculture that
causes wealth to increase." 1 " The category of
agriculture appears to afford an analytical benefit by
153 Frangois Quesnay, "Corn," in Ronald L. Meek, The
Economics of Physiocracy: Essays and Translations
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 72.
154 Quesnay, "Corn", quoted in Meek, Economics of
Physiocracy, p. 73.
155 Quesnay, "General Maxims", in Meek, Economics of
Physiocracy, p. 232. Quesnay was the first to cast
productivity only in terms of agriculture. Previously,
the relation was conceived as a form of "par" or rate
of correspondence between land and labour. Quesnay
established a hierarchical relationship between the two
elements in which land alone accounted for the increase
in real wealth. Of course, the physiocratic focus on
agriculture is a function of the actual basis of
economic activity in France. Manufacture was not to
assume an analytical role until the British engaged the
discussion. (See also Meek, Economics of Physiocracy,
pp. 379-382 for a discussion of this "exclusive
productivity" with regard to existing social and
political conditions.)
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providing the most patent representation of "clear
gain" or surplus as distinguishable from circulation.
To wit: the amount of food consumed by the laborer plus
what is used on seed is on the average less than the
amount of produce raised. 156
Now, despite the fact that exchange is considered
useful, often absolutely necessary
,
" it is identified,
along with manufacture, as sterile. 157 In the
explanations of the Tableau Economique
,
Quesnay tells
us that "trade .. .multiplies sales and purchases without
multiplying things, and. .. represents nothing but an
addition to sterile expenditure." 158 According to
Quesnay, because exchange represents a mere transfer of
goods, exchange always entails the transfer of
commodities of equal value. As we are told, it is
impossible that gain could be created from exchange,
for no one would exchange a commodity for another of
inferior value: " trade is only an exchange of value for
equal value, and... so far as these values are concerned
there is neither loss nor gain as between the
156 Marx, Theories of Surplus Value, vol. I, p. 44.
157 See Vaggi, Economics of Frangois Quesnay, pp. 42-
45.
158 Quesnay, from the "Second Edition of the Tableau,
"
in Meek, Economics of Physiocracy, pp. 119 and 130.
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contracting parties.— This relegation of exchange to
an auxiliary status approximates the mercantilist
notion of domestic gain as a mere "vibration" of wealth
within a country and thus, as not contributing to a net
surplus, performing a purely mechanical distributive
function. 160
This description of exchange falls into one of
two general categories of exchange articulated by the
Physiocrats: that of resale trade, le commerce de
revendeur
. This category of transaction, according
to Quesnay, can not alter the value of a commodity and
therefore renders such exchanges "sterile." 162 This is
to say, "As with money, the products exchanged exist
before they start to circulate among individuals. The
process of resale does not affect their physical
quantities . " 163
159 Quesnay, "Dialogue on the Work of Artisans," in
Meek, Economics of Physiocracy, p. 214.
160 See Quesnay, "Men," in Meek, Economics of
Physiocracy, pp. 92-3.
161 Vaggi, Economics of Francois Quesnay, p. 44.
162 The use of sterile is related to the Physiocratic
division of society into two fundamental classes --
productive and unproductive. (See Meek, Economics of
Physiocracy, pp. 150-8)
.
163 Vaggi, Economics of Francois Quesnay, pp. 44-6.
Such an argument is not an uncommon expression of
suspicion toward exchange as a means to profit without
value-addition. Hence the legitimacy of "production"
which adds tangible value to a good. (Here value is
assumed to be an expression of "physical qualities."
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The other category of exchange is that of "sales
at first-hand," vente de la premiere main. The prices
of the products of land, the Physiocrats argue, are
only determined on this first-hand market; likewise,
first-hand sales are associated with the physiocratic
concept of "permanent" prices. As we are told by
Quesnay, "it is precisely by these sales that it is
possible to measure the value of the annual produce of
the nation s wealth." 1 "'1 Unique to the physiocrats, the
notion of first-hand sales refers to the transaction
between the producer and the merchant who initially
purchases the commodity. It is only after commodities
have completed this initial exchange transaction that
the second category of resale exchange is entered.
Since the first category of exchange is defined as
not existing within the category of circulation proper,
but a part of the category of production, the
possibility of a clear division between the two
categories is negated; this is because physiocratic
"production" actually includes the initial act of
164 Quesnay, "Analysis," quoted in Vaggi, Economics of
Francois Quesnay, p. 41)
.
Mirabeau wholly defines
circulation in this way. As he writes, "here by
circulation we mean only the purchases first-hand."
(Vaggi, Economics of Francois Quesnay, p. 43)
.
For
further definitions of circulation also see Meek,
Economics of Physiocracy, p. 119.
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exchange. This inclusion entails that the allegedly
autonomous category of agricultural production, the
self-contained foundation of the system, can only be
ultimately defined as a function of exchange. In this
way, exchange, in the form of exchange-value,
contaminates the sovereignty of production.
The difficulty in definitively establishing
production as the autonomous source of the economic
process is paralleled in Quesnay' s governing dictum of
utility, or use. It is subsistence, as we are told,
which forms the foundation of society. Accordingly,
the physiocrats' notion of utility emphasizes the
particular physical characteristics of a commodity,
characteristics which make it suitable for the
satisfaction of a particular need. Quesnay defines
general consumption" as that which "satisfies the
needs of life." 1 " Such an assertion follows the
physiocratic definition of wealth, in opposition to
mercantilist thought, not as money but as tangible
goods. However, as we saw also with Aristotle, the
construct of utility is likewise deployed as a means to
circumscribe the potential excesses of wealth:
"land. . .constitutes wealth only because of the fact
that its products are necessary to satisfy men's
165 And, "the foundation of society is the subsistence
of men." (Meek, Economics of Physiocracy, p. 55). Cf.
Vaggi, Economics of Francois Quesnay, p. 59.
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needs... and because it is these needs themselves which
are the basis of wealth."*” And, via the same
sollipcism, it is a means of defining exchange:
the action of exchange
... is only necessary to
satisfy the need which is itself the cause of exchange.
One must then distinguish what is only necessary from
what is productive." 167
The pairing of exchange with utility is cast,
however, in yet another form. Quesnay maintains that
normal trading situations" are governed by utility.
When regulated by utility, the exchange transaction is
deemed to be always advantageous to both buyer and
seller. Such a scenario occurs because, as it is
suggested, an individual will never exchange one
commodity against another unless convinced of a gain --
in utility. Hence, "one must always assume that it
[exchange] is always profitable to both contracting
parties." 168 This is possible due to the fact that
utility deems that any given commodities can be
"enjoyed quite differently by different people" --
thus creating a mutuality of gain.
166 Meek, Economics of Physiocracy, p. 84.
167 Quesnay, "Reponse au Memoire de M.H.," quoted in
Vaggi, The Economics of Francois Quesnay
,
p. 45.
168 Quesnay, "On the Work of Artisans," quoted in
Vaggi, The Economics of Francois Quesnay, p. 60. (Cf.
Meek's somewhat convoluted version of this passage, The
Economics of Physiocracy, p. 214).
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The problem with this description of a transaction
commodity for commodity — is that it implies a
situation of barter, not an exchange mediated by money.
For the Quesnay, this is a tricky element to introduce
because, as noted, the physiocrats attempt to shift
away from defining wealth through money to defining it
m terms of useful goods. As we are nonetheless told,
m order to achieve the form of wealth, agricultural
goods must become commercables
.
169 So, although use-
value exists as a condition for the exchangibility of a
commodity, the amount of wealth measured in exchange
depends solely upon the exchange-value of the
commodity. 1 ' That is, only the exchange-value of a
commodity can be used as a measure of the amount of
wealth embodied in it, 1 and use value is here revealed
as thus only a prerequisite to exchange value. The
169 See Vaggi, Economics of Francois Quesnay
,
p. 40
and Meek, The Economics of Physiocracy, pp. 89-91.
170 Meek, The Economics of Physiocracy, p. 90. The
difficult proximity between the two crops up at nearly
every turn. In this instance, the context is the
attempt to define the "wealth" in its non-nominal form:
"If a kingdom is poor, that is not, as is vulgarly
claimed, because it lacks money, but because it lacks
exchangeable wealth." (Meek, The Economics of
Physiocracy, p. 92)
.
171 Quesnay, "Maxims," quoted in Meek, The Economics
of Physiocracy, p. 235.
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emergence of wealth from the process of production can
thus only become fully manifest within the exchange
transaction.
The relation of exchange, as I am suggesting,
indicates the point at which the physiocratic structure
is at its most vulnerable. This becomes all the more
clear in a third example. In dividing acts of exchange
into two categories, Merciere de la Riviere writes, "a
man trafique when he buys and resells the commodities
which originally belonged to other men ; a man commerce
when he obtains from his own land the commodities which
he exchanges against some other values." 172
The ambiguity between the two posited categories
of exchange — "first-hand" versus "retail" sale — is
here expressed not through the categories of exchange
per se, but through a specific class of exchangers --
the merchants. Given the preeminence granted to
production in the creation of surplus and the lack of a
possibility of surplus in the second-hand market, the
interjection of the merchant appears surprising, a
second-order element of an already diminished role of
exchange. Merchants, as Quesnay tells us, necessarily
operate in the "first-hand" market, a market linking
172 Quoted in Vaggi, Economics of Francois Quesnay, p.
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producers of commodities and the purchasers, 173 as well
as playing a role in the second-hand market. The
complaint runs thus: merchants take advantage of their
"privileged position" in the process of circulation and
"at the expense of either end of transaction
,
"
operating only in their own interest which is "always
that of buying as cheap as possible and selling as dear
as possible." 174 Riviere also warns us of the merchant
as the agent intermedaire who keeps for himself ten
measures on your corn and the same on my wine." 175 The
gain of the merchant does not only neglect to
contribute to, but rather diminishes the surplus
product, the produit net, of the nation. Therefore,
the interest of the majority of traders stand opposed
to those of the majority of citizens. 176
173 See Vaggi, Economics of Francois Quesnay, pp. 66-68 .
174 Vaggi, Economics of Francois Quesnay, p. 67.(italics added)
.
175 Quoted in Vaggi, The Economics of Francois
Quesnay, p. 67. The merchants thus interpose
themselves between the producer and the final consumer:
"Their activity is not limited to the mere
transportation of products from town to country and
province to province nor is it sporadic or unusual."
( Economics of Francois Quesnay, p. 66) .
176 Mirabeau adopts a less acrimonious tone. In any
society, as he writes, "people compete against one
another for their survival and enjoyment; everybody
tries to acquire goods for himself ... Each man tries to
satisfy his needs while minimizing his expenses and
toil." (Meek, The Economics of Physiocracy, pp. 212-
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The merchant, as so positioned in the physiocratic
analysis, characterizes a recurring problem: the
difficulty of theorizing a full separation between the
vaunted sphere of production and the realm of exchange.
The merchant, in effect, performs a neat traversal of
the two carefully constructed production/exchange
categories and as it seems, becomes a scapegoat for
the potentia of adventitious gain, as falling outside
the construction of "real wealth" as produced through
agriculture
.
The stakes which seem to underlie the attempt to
cordon off the excessive elements by establishing one
particular form or location as the seat of
excessiveness or adventitiousness, 1 not only indicate
the ambiguity between forms of exchange, but
demonstrates a fundamental structural deficiency in the
Physiocrats' claim to analytical comprehensiveness.
Because an excess as "surplus" can exist only to the
extent that it is granted expression within the Tableau
-- rooted, that is, in the production/first-hand
exchange classification -- gain existing outside the
produit net cannot be represented. The ambiguous
177 A forthcoming project will argue that much of the
history of anti-semitism is related to this general
ambiguity.
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excess of exchange, here cast in terms of the gain of
the merchant, thus outdoes or exceeds the analytical
totality attempted by the Tableau Economique.
The significance attributed to the physiocratic
programme by the history of economic thought, namely,
the analytical shift to production as the founding
principle of analysis, masks an old proclivity. The
Physiocratic preoccupation with surplus garnered from
nature, not from one's fellow citizens, reflects an
alternative solution to the uncertain character of
material acquisition. To pose land as a self-
sufficient entity in the origin of gain is to
constitute a "surplus" sui generis; as it is an
autonomous "free gift" of nature, recounting
Aristotle's ideal form of chremistike. The isolation
of an agricultural surplus succeeds precisely as a form
of a foreclosure on the difficulties of acquisition by
exchange; namely, that of a potentially unequal
acquisition exacted from one's fellows. Physiocratic
"gain" as a function of both "natural" abundance and
production, casts a category of surplus as a pure
positivity. This is to say, no transgressive elements
are in excess of the produit net — other than the
difficulties posed by exchange. The resort to exchange
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as a means of defining production marks the weak point
Of the Tableau by posing the allegedly autonomous
category of agricultural production, the self-contained
sine qua non of the system, as ultimately beholden to
the still errant exchange function.
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CHAPTER III
ADAM SMITH AND THE TRANSMOGRIFICATION OF EXCHANGE
A. Production and "Universal Opulence"-
The Division ol Labor ~
As Previously suggested, the idea of production,
situated as the new pivot of economic analysis,
signified the end of a perception of a world of finite
economic goods in which the gain of one entailed the
loss of another. Adam Smith, who follows the
physiocrats in asserting production as the reigning
element of economic analysis, is responsible for the
most innovative, and by any count, the most successful
modification of the notion of exchange. In Smith's
epochal Wealth of Nations, the issues associated with
exchange undergo prodigious changes. An account of the
construction of a transmuted understanding of
individual pecuniary gain begins with the notion which
inaugurates the Wealth of Nations r the division of
labor
.
As his organizing feature of production. Smith
opens the Wealth of Nations with the concept of the
division of labor. Broadly defined as the separation
of a process of production into parts, each of which is
carried on by a separate person, the concept of the
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division of labor may be traced from its most
rudimentary forms in classical Greece. 178 it is Smith's
emphasis on the division of labor, however, which makes
his account so extraordinary. As Joseph Schumpeter
remarks, "nobody, either before or after A. Smith ever
thought of putting such a burden upon the division of
labor... With A. Smith it is practically the only factor
in economic progress." 179
The prodigious increase in guantity of work
provided by the division of labor according to Smith,
is due to three factors: an increase in dexterity of
the workman, saving of time commonly lost in
178 The concept of the division of labor as the
specialization of work processes may be traced from
Xenophon, through Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Luther,
Thomas Mun, John Locke, and Bernard Mandeville. (SeeCannan s account in A Review of Economic Theory and
Bonar's summary in Philosophy and Economics)
. The
concept is also to be found in works in which the
economic aspect is not so pronounced; for example, in
the writings of Hegel ( Philosophy of Right) and
Schiller ( The Aesthetic Education of Man). The
division of labor was revived in the English economic
literature at the latter portion of the 17th century,
in Sir William Petty's 1671 Political Arithmetick.
179 Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis, p. 187.
As elsewhere noted, it is "Smith's emphasis on the
division of labor as a factor in growth via its
enormous influence on productivity which makes his
treatment of the subject so original." (The New
Palgrave : A Dictionary of Political Economy [London:
Macmillan Press, 1987], s.v. "division of labor"). Cf.
Marx, Capital, vol. I, p. 348, nt. 4.
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’sauntering’ from one species of work to another and
the invention of new machinery by workmen. 180 The
emphasis Smith places upon these three claims for the
division of labor have been vigorously contested by one
of Smith's greatest admirers, Dugald Stewart. 181
First, although Stewart acknowledges that a worker
increases dexterity by engaging only one task, he
argues that the actual gain is limited. "The advantage
gained by the division of labor," Stewart writes
...bears so very small a proportion to that whichis gained in the last result, that it is by no
means entitled to stand at the head of the
enumeration; and certainly goes a very littlelength in accounting for that minute division and
subdivision of labor which has been introduced into
some of the most prosperous manufactures of this
country. 182
Stewart thus agrees with Lauderdale "where he observes,
that even in the trade of the pin maker, without the
use of machinery to supersede the work of the hand, no
great progress could have been made in the rapidity
180 Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of
the Wealth of Nations [1776] ed. Edwin Cannan (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1976), pp. 11-14.
181 Stewart begins his discussion of the division of
labor somewhat dryly: "The observation, that ’A Jack of
all trades is master of none', is one of those maxims
of common sense which the slightest survey of human
life forces on the most careless observer." (Lectures
on Political Economy [1855] [New York: Augustus M.
Kelley, 1968]
, pp. 310-11)
.
182 Stewart, Lectures on Political Economy, p. 315.
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with which pins are formed." 1 * 3 With regard to Smith's
second point, while it was true that to some extent
time was saved by the worker not changing tasks,
Stewart notes that "the economy of time gained in this
way must plainly bear a still more inconsiderable
proportion than the former, to the magnitudes of the
effect which it is brought to explain." 184 As for the
third factor, the invention of machinery, Stewart
acknowledges that the division of labor does indeed
spur mechanical innovation, but, as he points out,
Smith s single proof of the boy who improves a steam
engine in order to acquire more play-time, is
extremely unsatisfactory." Such invention, Stewart
suggests, is unlikely because the effect would not
necessarily shorten the work day for the inventor;
moreover, it could well lead to the loss of a job. 185
183 Stewart, Lectures on Political Economy, p. 315.
184 Stewart, Lectures on Political Economy, p. 315.
John Rae ( Statement of Some New Principles on the
Subject of Political Economy [1834] [New York: Augustus
M
:
Kelle Y' 1964]) regarded savings in tools as far more
significant than time saved. Variations on these
criticisms are echoed in the work of other 19th century
writers such as Charles Babbage {On the Economy of
Machinery and Manufactures [Philadelphia: Carey & Lea,
1832]) and Andrew Ure ( Philosophy of Manufacture [1835]
[London: Cass, 1967]).
185 Stewart, Lectures on Political Economy, p. 318.
And, as Hegel writes, as the division of labor makes
"work more and more mechanical .. .man is able to step
aside and install machines in his place." ( Philosophy
of Right [New York: Oxford Press, 1952], p. 129}. See
also Andrew Ure, The Philosophy of Manufactures
.
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Moreover, the division of labor relies upon the
principle of a single simple function, whereas
mechanical innovation requires considerably broader
knowledge. The origin of innovation, Stewart
concludes, is thus not to be found in "living
automatons, who are employed in the details of the
work
.
1,186 According to Stewart, it not the worker but
the employer or "speculative observer" who is
significant to the process of innovation. 187
These three advantages derived from the division of
labor by Smith are all associated with the division of
labor in production. In Smith’s terminology, this
division of labor in what he refers to as the "trifling
manufactures" is where the effects of the division of
labor are most readily understood:
the important business of making a pin is... divided
into about eighteen distinct operations ... Each
person, therefore, making a tenth part of a forty-
eight thousand pins, might be considered as making
four thousand eight hundred pins in a day. 188
186 Stewart, Lectures on Political Economy, p. 318.
187 Stewart, Lectures on Political Economy, p. 318. A
"spectator" that workmen "are placed under the view
of..." is mentioned at Wealth of Nations, p. 8.
188 Smith, Wealth of Nations, pp. 8-9. In every other
art and manufacture, we are told, "the effects of the
division of labor are the same, resulting in a
"proportionable increase in the productive powers of
labor .
"
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This characterization of the division of labor,
however, is not sustained throughout Smith's account.
A second form is present, a form referred to as the
"social" division of labor. m this form, the division
of labor is posed in terms of a broader function in
which the emphasis is on the exchange of the
commodities between commodity owners. 189 Smith's term
for this is "great" as opposed to "trifling"
manufactures
—those which supply "the great wants of
the great body of people." As we are told,
...every different branch of the work employs sogreat a number of workmen, that it is impossible tocollect them all into the same workhouse. We
seldom see more, at one time, than those employedin one single branch. Though in such manufactures,therefore, the work may really be divided into a
much greater number of parts, than in those of a
more trifling nature, the division is not near so
obvious, and has been accordingly been much less
observed. 190
189 The use of the term "social" with regard to a
second category of the division of labor is commonlyfound in the Marxian context. The distinction between
the social division of labor by commodity exchange and
its division within the labor process for which
exchange does not intervene, is crucial for Marx.
Smith s neglect in clearly making this distinction is
discussed in section four of the chapter on the
division of labor, in volume I of Capital. Smith, of
course, is here not alone, for the collapse of this
distinction within the division of labor marks all of
classical and neoclassical economic thought.
190 Smith, Wealth of Nations, p. 8. This statement
leads Marx (who inserts his own parenthetical
exclamation mark at the end of the quote) to argue that
for Smith, the difference between the division of labor
in production and in society as a whole was "merely
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Two contrary tendencies are thus found in the two
unclarified forms of the division of labor —
tendencies which underscore the apparent existence of a
breach between the claims for the division of labor and
the actual gains in productivity. In one instance, the
reigning principle of (an increase in) production is
fundamentally associated with the division of labor in
production -- the production of the single, tangible
commodity. This "preference," as David Levine phrases
it, serves to "obliterate the exchange relations which
tie together the elements of the division of labor";
consequently, different manufactures are simply parts
of one great manufacture" and the presence of exchange
becomes merely one of form. 191 The two forms of the
division of labor, as functions of production, on the
one hand, and exchange, on the other, confront one
another in the passage where Smith describes how
"universal opulence" occurs as an outcome of the
division of labor:
subjective," that is, existing "merely for the
observer." (Capital, vol. I, p. 354). Cf. Ronald Meek,
Studies in the Labor Theory of Value (London: Lawrence
& Wishart, 1973), p. 61.
191 David P. Levine, Economic Studies: Contributions
to the Critique of Political Economy (Boston: Routledge
& Kegan Paul, 1977), p. 46 and p. 37, respectively.
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Every workman has a great cruant i -t-v of y, •to dispose of beyond what he himself has
W°rk
for; and every other workman being in exactlv Jhe
auantftv'ofT'
he iS enabled to exchange a ^reatq ntity of his own goods for a great mianH?,,what amounts to the same thing, for the price if a'great quantity of theirs. He supplies themabundantly with what they have occasion for andthey accommodate him as amply with what he hasoccasion for, and a general plenty diffuses itselfthrough all the different ranks of society?^
To suggest that every workman has "a great quantity of
his own work to dispose of," and that every other is in
"exactly the same situation," is to negate the division
of labor in production which is central to Smith’s
argument in the Wealth of Nations
,
193 in other words,
the piecemeal role played by the worker in the
fabrication of commodities is not applicable to the act
of exchange, which presumes full ownership as the
prerequisite of the transaction. 194
In the section which follows, Smith’s fundamental
investiture in the division of labor in production, on
one hand, and his subsequent ambivalence with regard to
192 Smith, Wealth of Nations, p. 15.
193 Cf. Levine, Economic Studies, p. 44.
194 See Marx’s examples at the beginning of his
chapter on the division of labor which usefully
distinguish between the varying forms of pre-capitalist
and pre-industrial manufacture as opposed to later
capitalist forms. ( Capital
,
vol. I, pp. 337-338). Of
course, many pre-capitalist forms of the division of
labor did themselves not meet the criteria which Smith
indicates -- that of an independent artisan-producer
who has full ownership of an object.
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the less prominent "social" or exchange form of the
division of labor, is resolved in an astonishing
manner. In the final portion of the first chapter we
find the oft-quoted passage inviting us to ponder the
material world of the laborer;
...the different parts of his dress and hishousehold furniture, the course linen shirt which
,
hl
J
skin, the shoes which coverhis feet, the bed which he lies on... the kitchengrate upon which he prepares his victuals.
No less, our attention is directed to the coal with
which he prepares his food "dug from the bowels of the
earth and brought to him by a long sea and a long land
carriage.
"
19s The extraordinary things about this
passage is that although phrased in terms of the
"advantages" of the single laborer, the picturesque
language admits of no individual exertion. Objects are
somehow "dug, " and, whilst the common man awaits, these
objects are directly "brought" to him — despite all
manner of arduous difficulty. Not only is the laborer
distanced from the principle of labor, but also from
the requirements of exchange. Hence, the heady and
vertiginous sense evoked by the passage.
Smith's phrasing may be fruitfully compared to a
similar passage in Bernard Mandeville's Fable of the
Bees with regard to the procurement of goods. In this
195 Smith, Wealth of Nations, p. 16.
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passage, „e are invited to "reflect on the toil and
hazard that are to be undergone abroad, the vast seas
we are to go over, the different climates we are to
endure, and the several nations we must be obliged to
for their assistance." 196
Mandeville
' s account, we may note, does not
produce the same effect as Smith's; it is more
continent, as anchored by not only the sobering mention
of obligation," but a string of pronouns. In Smith's
version, "we" are ever so far from the scene of the
factory — suspended, as it were, in a nether realm
between the two forms of the division of labor. The
idea of "opulence" in this scenario takes on a new
inflection as pure gratis it creates a new and
extraordinary form of absolute surplus. In Smith's
account, the humble objects of "opulence," outflank
both direct labor and exchange, appearing, as it were,
out of thin air. One lacks immediate obligation to
one's fellows, and matter itself is made to exude an
almost mysterious atmosphere — mere coal, linen
shirts and stove-grates become objects worthy of
astonishment. This mis-en-scene depicting an
indisputably ideal expression of both production and
196 Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees: Or Private
Vices
, Publick Benefits [1732] vol. II (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1924), p. 335. Compare also to
Locke's discussion of the division of labor in "Civil
Government", §43.
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exchange through their absolute negation, overwhelming
both issues of magnitude and the awkward relation
between the division of labor in production and the
division of labor expressing itself through exchange.
Indeed, an alternate variant of an invisible hand is
here suggested, a resolution of plot complexities, a
deus ex machina. Through such macrological
superaddition, the worker, the common man, here somehow
obtains something for nothing, a strange turn indeed on
the "unearned increment" of capitalist production. in
this apotheosis of the division of labor, labor itself
is transmogrified, or rather, completely transcended.
The passage with which Smith closes the chapter
likewise contains hyperbole of some significance:
...if we examine, I say, all these things, and
consider what a variety of labor is employed about
each of them, we shall be sensible that without the
assistance and co-operation of many thousands, the
very meanest person in a civilized country could
not be provided, even according to what we veryfalsely imagine, the easy and simple manner in
which he is commonly accommodated. Compared
indeed, with the more extravagant luxury of the
great, his accommodation must no doubt appear
extremely simple and easy, and yet it may be true,
perhaps, that the accommodation of an European
prince does not always so much exceed that of an
industrious and frugal peasant, as the
accommodation of the latter exceeds that of many an
African King, the absolute master of the lives and
liberties of ten thousand naked savages. 197
197 Smith, Wealth of Nations
,
p. 16.
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The hyperbolic language is, again, symptomatic of the
limitations and difficulties of the chapter at large,
While the nature of the "opulence which extends to all
classes" here takes another turn. A strange atmosphere
is at work - only a few sentences have elapsed since
it was established that the "most mean" had at one's
disposal the labor of hundreds, nay, thousands.
Now, the "meanest of persons," who in the prior passage
did not need to divest in order to receive, nor labor
m order to possess, is now positioned in a sphere in
which economic "opulence" runs closely alongside a form
of dominion "absolute mastery." Through this
juxtaposition, there is a suggestive blurring between
the authority of rulership and that authority conferred
by the "command" of objects. As availed by the labor
of thousands, the priveledged notions of "cooperation
and assistance" are, in the final instance, posed in a
language that is strikingly autocratic. 198
The notion of production as the pivot of economic
analysis lays the ground for a material world that is
no longer constituted by a finite set of objects which
198 An interesting parallel may be drawn between the
rhetorical tone of the above passage and the position,
held in some quarters, that Smith's labor theory of
value is essentially a theory of the disutility of
labor. See for example, Marian Bowley, Studies in the
History of Economic Theory Before 1870 (London:
Macmillan Press, 1973)
.
93
are to be contested at the expense of one another, but
a realm of potentia in which all possess the capacity
to gain, as conferred by the essential quality of
labor in the Wealth of Nations
,
the division of
labor is made to assume the burden of the concept of
production en toto.
The division of labor in production, which, as
argued, is necessarily a form of incrementalism, is
conceptually contrary to Smith’s tendency in this
chapter to emphasize the absolute and universal idea of
opulence" -- the pivotal promise of the Wealth of
Nations. In other words, this gap between the form and
the content of the chapter is also the breach between
an ideal of absolute magnitude and the limits of
incremental necessity. The ability of the division of
labor to shoulder the larger claims of the Wealth of
Nations is thus, as suggested, arguable. The
conceptualization of the division of labor must, for
this very reason, be fortified against further
potential diminution, as represented by the
vicissitudes of exchange as the necessary and defining
characteristic of the "social" division of labor -- as
opposed to that which is autonomous. Once again, the
199 As opposed to the mercantilists who only regarded
the "objective essence of wealth" (money), Smith, as
Marx writes, discovered in labor the "subjective
essence of wealth."
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ideal of production is rendered structurally and
conceptually ambiguous because of the necessary entry
into the social form.
On one hand, Smith initially resists acknowledging
fully the social division of labor, in instances we
have noted above. However, the social division of labor
serves a specific, if understated, purpose. As
conceived as a mere formal distributive element, this
form of social transaction serves as a bulwark for a
significant part of Smith’s argument. Namely, the
presentation of wealth as an "opulence" which is
universal, that is to say, mutual and cooperative. 200
Now, the appearance of exchange as a means to
reinforce the fundamental principle of mutuality can
only be so by assuming a form which is made to appear
specifically and solely as a function of simple
distribution; hence performing a broadly "equalizing"
function. Suffice it to say that the category of
profit is nowhere sighted in this spontaniously
promulgated "universal opulence."
As we will recall, each individual has a "great
quantity" ("equal magnitudes") to exchange ("beyond
200 Halevy emphasizes Smith's use of the division of
labor as itself a demonstration of the "theorem of the
identity of interests." ( The Growth of Philosophical
Radicalism, pp. 90-91)
.
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what he himself has occasion for"). 201 However, the
function of distribution as so connected with a general
"opulence" is only conceivable if there exists neither
nominal forms of mediation, nor the possibility of an
excessive individual incremental remainder of exchange
of course, in this context the later is not a
problem because production has assumed the preeminent
role previously allotted to exchange while the former
issue is simply not part of the portrayal. Although
Smith interjects the notion of price into the above
passage, it will be noted that this already presumes
that the labor theory of value is in place; it is
inconsequential to the actual argument in this chapter
and will not make its appearance until chapter five.
Smith's appropriation of the language associated
with pure distribution -- that is, associated with the
first paradigm of exchange which is only fully enacted
as mutuality without individual gain, through the
barter form -- is involved in one other way. Namely,
that the nature of the "wealth" discussed is
characterized as not a monetary gain, but, as for
Quesnay, a gain in goods. The magnification of the
qualities of certain quotidian commodities — the pin,
the linen shirt -- are telling of the preeminence
granted to this form of "wealth."
201 Smith, Wealth of Nations, p. 15.
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In short, Smith's portrayal of exchange presents
no trace of the possibility of the excesses of
exchange; the numerical demands of equal exchange are
absorbed, first, by the "universal abundance" which
conditions the tone of the chapter, and, when exchange
is invoked, employs the vernacular of a distributive or
barter form. in this way, problematic excesses or
individual advantage are not to be found in this
chapter -- only circulating magnitudes of "abundance."
--
—Exchange : " Of the Principle Which Gives Qccas ion
to the Division of Labour"
As illustrated in the prior chapter, the division
of labor, although asserted as a source of a mutual
abundance, is positioned if at times somewhat
tenuously — as the central productive factor in the
first chapter of Wealth of Nations. In this initial
chapter, exchange is broadly positioned as a neutral
element of distribution -- as befits its secondary
status. For as we are told at the onset of chapter
two, the division of labour is the consequence of "the
propensity to truck, barter and exchange one thing for
another." 202 Smith's effort to craft a neutral role for
exchange which does not encroach upon the import of the
principle of production is underscored by the order of
202 Smith, Wealth of Nations, p. 17.
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these first two chapters: despite the fact that for
Smith, exchange conceptually precedes the division of
labour, he places the chapter on exchange after the
chapter treating the division of labor. The same
impulse may be observed with regard to the fact that no
direct mention of "exchange," the principal subject of
Smith's second chapter, is permitted to enter into the
chapter's title, "Of the Principle which gives Occasion
to the Division of Labour" — an omission which serves
to likewise maintain the emphasis on the reigning
principle, "production."
The propensity" to exchange, Smith tells us at
the beginning of chapter two, is either "one of those
original principles in human nature, or... as seems more
probable ... the necessary consequence of the faculties
of reason and speech. "^ Ilj Smith poses exchange as a
function of "expediency" — we have simply not the time
"on every occasion" to venture other forms of appeal,
or to rely on the "benevolence" of others. 204 Such
expediency. Smith tells us in language echoing that of
the prior chapter, is crucial due to the vast numbers
of persons with whom one necessarily transacts: "In
civilized society [he] stands at all times in need of
203 Smith, Wealth of Nations, P- 17.
204 Smith, Wealth of Nations, P- 17.
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the cooperation and assistance of great multitudes." 205
The human species is thus differentiated from all
others "who seem to know neither this nor any other
species of contracts." 206 To the degree that animals
act in consort, it is merely the result of an
"accidental concurrence of passions"; indeed, "Nobody
ever saw a dog make a fair and deliberate exchange of
one bone for another with another dog." 207
Smith associates the capacity for speech
specifically with the potential for persuasion. The
introduction of persuasion appears to be not entirely
confluent with this context, for it weakens Smith's
first portrayal of exchange, as appearing in chapter
one, as a spontaneous facilitation or rather, a
diffusion
,
of "great opulence." As enacted through
persuasion, one can not simply and instantaneously
205 Smith, Wealth of Nations, p. 17.
206 Smith, Wealth of Nations, p. 17.
207 Smith, Wealth of Nations, p. 18. Animals, bereft
of speech, and those humans who have nothing to
exchange, must resort to other "servile" means: "a
spaniel endeavors by a thousand attractions to engage
the attention of his master" while "Man sometimes uses
the same arts with his brethren... endeavor ( ing) by
every servile and fawning attention to obtain their
good will." (Smith, Wealth of Nations, p. 18).
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exchange, rather, one must be persuaded to exchange —
despite the occasions provided by the surpluses created
by the division of labor. 208
The notion of persuasion is nonetheless pivotal to
the passage which is the famous centerpiece of chapter
two
:
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, therewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner
ut from their regard to their own interest. Weaddress ourselves, not to their humanity but to
eir love, and never talk to them of our own
necessities but of their advantages. 209
The astonishingly blunt pronouncement of "self-love"
marks this passage as the scandal of the Smithian
corpus. As a depiction of a willful assertion of self-
interest in the act of exchanging, this passage is
startling not only for the vigorous assertion of
208 Smith, Wealth of Nations, p. 18. The association
of the "expediency" of exchange with speech in this
particular form, appears to tax aspects of his account,
namely the very possibility of "expediency" itself.
209 Smith, Wealth of Nations, p. 18. The significance
of this passage is described by Kenneth Lux, who sees
it as representing "The very core of Smith’s work, the
idea that is taken to be the essence of his
contribution... This statement is so important that it
could fairly well be said that if one were to choose a
statement that most characterizes the transition from
the thinking of the Middle Ages to that of modern
economic society, it would be this. It is this
statement that represents the epochal significance of
Adam Smith as a philosopher and as the fate of
economics." ( Adam Smith's Mistake: How a Moral
Philosopher Invented Economics and Ended Morality
[Boston: Shambhala, 1990], pp. 24-5).
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self-interest, but also because of the context against
which this "self-love" is juxtaposed. This is to say,
the objective of the self-interest is indeed no more
than the simple procurement of an evening meal, a
modest intent situating "self-love" in the service of a
most benign purpose. Indeed, once the aim of the
transaction is perceived to be merely mutton, the
proclamation of "self-love" appears rather puffed-up in
this otherwise minute drama.
The revelation of the aim of the transaction,
however, lends no directive which might illuminate a
fundamental obscurity; for it is quite impossible to
ascertain from Smith's description if the transaction
portrayed is mediated by coinage or if it suggests a
barter transaction. Smith has, however, already
signalled an indifference to such a distinction in the
very beginning of the chapter where he quite speedily
by the second sentence, in fact -- collapses the
ffsrent forms of exchange into one single
propensity": thusly "to truck, to barter and to
exchange." 210 Since each form is thus itself rendered
interchangeable, what sort of an equivalency, then, can
210 Smith, Wealth of Nations
,
p. 17. "Trucking" is
generally associated with the barter form: "trading by
exchange of commodities, barter... "truck-economy is
the term used to denote the period which precedes the
use of money." (Oxford English Dictionary, s.v
"truck" )
.
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be said to exist within this transaction, in which the
only certain medium of exchange involves the vagaries
of "persuasion"?
We may begin an answer to this question by noting
that m Smith's depiction, we see none of the common
pejorative connotations associated with the role
persuasion may assume in an exchange transaction,
specifically, as some form of duplicity, dishonesty or
sharp practice." This is because the principal goal
of Smith's use of this notion is something other than a
simple assertion of "self-love." The significant point
is not so much the manipulation of the other
transactor s perception of advantage to suit oneself,
as, more significantly, that it establishes a
particular sort of identity between the two
transactors. That money is omitted from Smith's
account of exchange not only in this episode but
throughout the chapter -- is, in fact, fundamental to
grasping what I perceive to be the significance of this
portrayal of the exchange transaction. Namely, the
introduction of a version of adventitiousness rendered
autonomous from exchange-value , 211 Were money to be
present in this encounter, the identity which Smith is
211 The single reference to money in this chapter is
dropped in an aside regarding the beggar who also
invariably trades the various objects of charity for
"lodging, food or money." (Wealth of Nations, p. 18).
102
The subtle
here suggesting could not be established,
tenor of barter, a provisioning and distributive
expression of exchange conditioning the known elements
of the transaction is therefore highly significant.
The absence of money takes on an even greater
significance when compared to a passage from the
Lectures, a passage composed prior to the writing of
the Wealth of Nations:
If we should inquire into the principle in thehuman mind on which this disposition of trucking isfounded, it is clearly the natural inclination
every one has to persuade. The offering of a
which to us appears to have so plain and
simple a meaning, is in reality offering an
argument to persuade one to do so and so as it isfor his interest. 212
In this discussion of the "disposition of trucking," we
find Smith explicitly and unhesitatingly asserting a
direct association between persuasion and the money
form unlike the discretion exercised in the Wealth
of Nations.
As established in the first portion of this work,
the exchange relation, as a transaction of two diverse
elements, whether object for object or object for
money, can not effect a precise restitution. One
212 Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1978), p. 352.
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exception was noted earlier, namely, forms of symbolic
exchange occurring in particular indigenous communities
by which identical objects are exchanged in order to
express the renunciation of self-interest. 213 in this
instance of exchanging same for same, the economic or
distributive" goal of exchange is rendered moot, along
with any possibility of an excessive remainder.
Smith s account of exchange, in a variant twist,
involves a material transaction, but he has structured
it in such a way that it takes on an intangible
existence. Smith presents us with a purely abstract
transaction, which, as creating an occasion for a
precise repetition, posits an absolute and irrefutable
equalization. This "equalization," as effected by
the substitution of one's own "self-love" for that of
another, uses an intangible -- persuasion -- as the
medium of reflexivity. Because the advantaging is
itself rendered as transactable it is therefore
neutralized. Herein lies the origin, and indeed, the
very and possibility, of the famous solipcisms: "to
prevail is to interest another's self-love in one's own
favor" and "to show them that it is for their own
advantage to do for him what he requires of them." 214
In order to be rendered as non-excessive, the modality
213 See above, p. 1, nt. 1.
214 Smith, Wealth of Nations, p. 18.
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Of exchange is thus cast in an abstract form, creating
a matrix of transposition through which an
interchangeable pseudo-economic subject is created.
Here, the emphasis of the transaction shifts from the
matter transacted to the actors who transact, and
consequently, the exchange transaction is rendered
meta
-economic
.
The removal of quantity from the transaction is
aided by two implicit forms of exchange - forms which
are directly or indirectly associated with the barter
form. This innovative chapter is thus propped up with
the most rudimentary forms of economic practice. These
elements, taken from the paradigm of exchange as mutual
and beneficial, are subtle, but pervasive. One is cued
by reference to use-values, "necessities," mutton, as
well as the specious relevance of the inability of dogs
to barter bones, as well as the insertion of the medium
of persuasion" as the pivot of the exchange
transaction. Although these forms position exchange as
material transaction, the modality of exchange is thus
prevented from expressing itself in a form which
assumes a social expression of quantitatively, that is,
exchange-value. Through this removal of quantity in
the transaction, the possibility of individual
pecuniary gain is likewise foreclosed. Smith’s
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insertion of self-advantaging is notable (recall again
the hyperbole of the central exchange passage) if, as
the premise of the Health of Nations asserts, the
source of gain is not to be had within the realm of
exchange but in that of production?
Through the dematerialization of the exchange
transaction, which leaves only the act of transacting,
it is demonstrated that the exercise of such
propensities as "interest" and "self-love" do not
culminate in individual advantage. Through an emphasis
on the transaction as a purely formal and mechanical
equation, "mutuality" is redefined not in terms of
equal gain, but of the equal desire for gain.
"Advantage" is thus now not an unequal or unfair
quantity or increment, but a perception. Thus, in a
first instance, the transaction is unquantifiable; and,
in a second, the formal mechanism of a transactive
substitution carries the weight of the idea of exchange
qua transaction and not as matter transacted. The
non-quantitative exchange transaction, under the
auspice of "production,
"
provides a matrix for this
interchangibility, as a portrayal of the harmonious
relation between self-interested transactors. Smith
has executed a remarkable maneuver. He has secured not
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only a new ground of "equalization" in exchange, but
has introduced the idea of advantage in such a way so
as to establish a contained influence.
Smith’s stance in chapter two, and the strain it
portends, becomes all the more evident when juxtaposed
with the chapter which formally introduces money to the
Wealth of Nations. Because the portrayal of money as
an equalizing medium preserves the issue of exchange as
an equilibrium removed from issues of inequality or
disequilibrium, it is unsurprising that money is
presented by Smith as simply a medium of exchange, by
which "necessities" and "wants" are met, traceable
along a single trajectory of function from salt, shells
and tobacco to metal coinage, selected for its
durability and divisibility. -1 " It is instituted, we
are told, to "avoid. .. inconveniency. 1,216
Given what we have already seen, this
representation is not astonishing, as fitting with the
situation of exchange as itself performing a
distributive or circulative function. There is yet,
however, something of considerable interest in this
chapter. For all of Smith’s evasiveness with regard to
215 Smith, Wealth of Nations, p. 27. In the second
chapter of Book II Smith will return to the topic of
money in a more detailed fashion, in order to more
directly counter particular mercantilist
presuppositions
.
216 Smith, Wealth of Nations, p. 27.
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the presence of money in chapter two, it is quite
remarkable to now witness a retroactive
"clarification"
:
But when the division of labour first began to takeplace,
-.his power of exchanging must frequently
ave been much clogged and embarrassed in its
operations. One man, we shall suppose, has more ofa certain commodity than he himself has occasiontor, while another has less. The former would
consequently be glad to dispose of, and the latterto purchase, a part of this superfluity. But ifthis latter should chance to have nothing that theformer stands in need of, no exchange can be madebetween them. 217
We now return to the pivotal exchange scenario, with
one primary modification: the prior medium of the
exchange, persuasion, is ejected. Money is now
interjected as the mediating form, post facto
:
The butcher has more meat in his shop than he can
consume, and the brewer and the baker would each of
them be willing to purchase a part of it. But they
have nothing to offer in exchange, except the
respective productions of their respective trades
and the butcher is already provided with all the
bread and beer he has immediate occasion for. No
exchange can, in this case, be made between them. 218
In this discussion, the role of persuasion,
unsurprisingly, is truant, and no possible means or
suggestion of "advantaging" is present. The
retroactive insertion of the money form into chapter
217 Smith, Weal th of Nations, P- 26.
218 Smith, Weal th of Nations, P- 26.
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two underscores the obstructive capacity of exchange-
value to Smith’s preeminent goal in the first section
of the Wealth of Nations
,
that is, to establish a
foundation for "the doctrine of the mutuality of
interests
.
” 219
C. Barter and the Labor Theory of Value
Classical theories of exchange-value are, strictly
speaking, a means of imposing order upon exchange
beyond that which is granted by the nominal expression
of value, money. Smith’s labor theory of value appears
as a means of directly employing the reigning principle
of production to confine and define exchange-value.
Smith's theory of value, which asserts that value in
exchange is found in labor, and that only labor can
measure it, expresses Aristotle’s demand that the
objects exchanged be essentially, not merely
conventionally equalized. 220
The goal of equalization which such a theory
represents, however, is a problem which Smith’s
emphasis on production as the source of gain has
ostensibly rendered moot. Moreover, such a theoretical
219 See above, p. 16.
220 Smith is credited by Marx for recognizing labor as
the constitutive essence, the einfach subtanz of
commodities
.
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effort is not analytically congruent with the work at
large. As Schumpeter notes, Smith "wanted a price
theory by which to establish certain propositions that
do not require going into the background of the value
phenomenon at all." 221 Given this, why indeed is the
topic of value treated at all? The labor theory of
value as presented by Smith in the Wealth of Nations
serves, first and foremost, to reassert the primacy of
the principle of production as the origin of all
wealth, as first advanced by the division of labor. 222
However, there could also be a second purpose. In
chapter five of Book I, Smith introduces his two basic
formulations, "labor embodied," a definition of value
through production, as defined through the labor
contained in an object; and secondly, "labor
221 Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis
,
p. 22.
222 Smith, Wealth of Nations, p. 1. As Eric Roll
writes, "The great advance in economic thought which is
due to Smith is the emancipation from mercantilist and
physiocratic fetters. For two hundred years economists
had been searching for the ultimate source of wealth.
The mercantilists had found it in foreign trade. The
physiocrats had gone further and had shifted the origin
of wealth from the sphere of exchange to that of
production. But they had still remained confined
within one particular form of production, agriculture.
Adam Smith, building on the foundations of Petty and
Cantillon, effected the final revolution. With him
labour as such becomes the source of the fund which
originally supplies every nation." [A History of
Economic Thought, 3rd ed. [Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall], p. 154). See also Schumpeter, History
of Economic Analysis, p. 558, and Ronald Meek, Studies
in the Labour Theory of Value (New York: International
Publishers, 1956)
.
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commanded, a definition of value through exchange;
that is, as the amount of labor one can acquire through
the exchange of the object. 223 As Smith writes, all
value is rooted in an originary act of labor and, as
such, value may be traced, if at least in principle, to
this moment of origin:
What is bought with money or with goods ispurchased by labour, as much as what we acquire bythe toil of our own body. That money or those goodsindeed save us this toil. They contain the value
for
a
w^^
tain c5uant ity of labour which we exchangehat is supposed at the time to contain thevalue of an equal quantity. Labour was the firstprice, the original purchase that was paid for allthings. It was not by gold and silver but bvlabour, that all the wealth of the world was
originally purchased. 224
Here, production and exchange-value are drawn by Smith
into an initial accord through an originary act of
labor. Although labor is "precisely equal" to a
quantity of labour which it can enable one to purchase
223 Smith begins by again returning to an emphasis
upon the narrow capacity of each to fully furnish one's
"necessities and conveniencies" ; one is thus rich or
poor according to the quantity of labour one can
command
, or one can afford to purchase. "Once the
division of labour has thoroughly taken place, it is
but a very small part of these which a man's own labour
can provide him." ( Wealth of Nations
, p. 34).
224 Smith, Wealth of Nations
, p. 34. Cf. David Hume,
"everything in the world is purchased by labour". ("Of
Commerce," collected in Essays, ed. E. Miller
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1985) .
Ill
or command, " - value is not commonly estimated by
labour because of the difficulty of measuring it. The
different forms" of labour are therefore adjusted to
one another not by a precise method, but by a "higgling
and bargaining of the market... which though not exact
is sufficient for carrying on the business of common
life. Secondly, because commodities are more
commonly exchanged for other commodities than for
labour, they are most commonly compared with
commodities
:
It is more natural, therefore, to estimate [a
commodity s] exchangeable value by the quantity of
some other commodity than by the labor which it canpurchase. The greater part of people too understandbetter what is meant by a quantity of a particular
commodity, than by a quantity of labour. The oneis a plain palpable object; the other an abstract
notion, which, though it can be made sufficiently
intelligible, is not altogether so natural and
obvious
.
227
However, when "barter ceases" and "money has become the
common instrument of commerce, every particular
commodity is more frequently exchanged for money than
for any other commodity." 228 As Smith continues:
225 Smith, Weal th of Nations, P- 35.
226 Smith, Weal th of Nations, PP . 35-36.
227 Smith, Weal th of Nations, P- 36.
228 Smith, Weal th of Nations, P- 36. The comments
following this summation, however, could not have been
in any way anticipated — a second retroactive
incursion into the butcher-baker scenario. Again, the
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or of any other commodity which^an be^ad i n
b°Ur
exchange for it. 229 naa
The fundamental problem in Smith's account is that
he performs a circular series of assertions which fail
to define value-in-exchange in terms of labor.
Instead, one manifestation of exchange-value is used to
measure another, only prompting a return to the initial
problem. In the end, the "real" price of commodities
is also the price in labor; the nominal price is the
price in money; and with regard to labor, the "real"
price is the price in goods. 230
In the account of the labour theory of value in
chapter six, we find another example of a pre-currency
exchange -- although unlike the account in chapter
absolute lack of a role for persuasion may be noted:
The butcher seldom carries his beef or mutton to thebaker, or the brewer, in order to exchange them forbread and beer; but he carries them to the market wherehe exchanges them for money, and afterwards exchanges
that money for bread and for beer. The quantity of
money which he gets for them regulates too the quantity
of bread and beer he can afterwards purchase." (Smith,
Wealth of Nations
,
p. 36.)
229 Smith, Wealth of Nations, p. 36.
230 Despite all, at the end of the discussion Smith
reasserts his position: because money varies in value,
labour is thus the only stable and unvarying factor
which enters into exchange. ( Wealth of Nations, p. 37.)
The problems are, however, prohibitive enough for Smith
to use corn, not labor, in his actual analysis. ( Wealth
of Nations, p. 43) .
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two, the transaction is clearly demarcated as such,
existing m "that early and rude state of society." 231
Smith's account in this chapter provides a
demonstration that affords an alternative attempt to
reconcile labour embodied and labor commanded. As
Smith begins, "the proportion between the quantities of
labour necessary for acquiring different objects seems
to be the only circumstance which can afford any rule
of exchanging them one for another." 232 Further,
If among a nation of hunters, for instance it
usually costs twice the labour to kill a beaver
w ich it does to kill a deer, one beaver should
naturally exchange for or be worth two deer. Itis natural that what is usually the produce of twodays or two hours' labour should be worth double
of what is usually the produce of one days' or onehours labour. In this state of things, the wholeproduce of the labour belongs to the labourer; andthe quantity of labour commonly employed in
acquiring or producing any commodity is the only
circumstance which can regulate the quantity oflabour which it ought commonly to purchase,
command or exchange for. 233
231 That is, which "precedes both the accumulation of
stock and the appropriation of land." (Smith, Wealth of
Nations, p. 43) .
232 Smith, Wealth of Nations, p. 53.
233 Smith, Wealth of Nations
,
p. 54. Cf. Schumpeter,
History of Economic Analysis, pp. 188-89, 310. In the
subsequent history of economic thought, the split
between labor embodied and labor commanded is carried
on by Ricardo and Malthus, respectively. The third
direction of the analysis is the socialist critique of
the surplus extraction of labor.
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view of an essential and original economic condition
is here presented to the reader via the barter form of
exchange
.
Exchange, expressed non-quantitatively, creates a
union of the labor embodied and labor commanded forms,
a synthesis not fully enacted in Smith's prior attempt
at reconciliation. Transactivity no longer disrupts
the essence of production but now is manifested in the
object, not as a theory of value, but through the
blurring of production and exchange in labor as a mixed
form of "acquisition." As permitted by the absence of
quantitative forms, the barter transaction absorbs
attendant deficiencies, difficulties, and
dissimilitudes. Smith's essentialized labor in the
primordial state shows an ideal form of unmediated
acquisition, one that may be seen as somewhat of a
companion to the strange fable of acquisition which
ends the discussion of the division of labor.
Moreover, in this example we see barter sliding
imperceptibly into the sphere of pure opulence,
negotiating the [u]topos between production and
exchange, whereby a transmutation which includes and
exceeds the invariable slippage of the identity of
simple exchange is effected. Blurring the spheres of
exchange and production, this evokes what for Aristotle
would be an ideal form of chremistike .
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Smith's theory of value asserts a ''real" exchange-
value in opposition to the nominal expression of
exchange-value, which, as an independent feature,
exists as mere "appearance." The price mechanism,
which affords the structural distributive schematic of
the Wealth of Nations, is the structure which takes up
the task, after the terminus of the labor theory of
value, of finding and representing the exchange-value
("price") which is "real" to the exclusion of the
spurious form. The price mechanism does not thereby
absolutely treat the issue of exchange value so much as
it effectively bisects it: one version of value in
exchange is mapped and defined within the analytical
structure of the price mechanism, whereas the other
expression of exchange-value, as left solely to a
singular nominal expression, exists outside the matrix
and is thus rendered irrelevant to the broader
analysis
.
234
Several comments may be made with regard to the
relation between the labor theory of value, as the
234 See Thornstein Veblen's critique of the
"animistic" elements in Smith's use of the word "real."
("The Preconceptions of Economic Science," Journal of
Economics XIII, July 1899. Reprinted in Veblen, Marx,
Race, Science and Economics [New York: Capricorn Books,
1969] ) .
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essential representation of labour which is to provide
an equalizing order to the exchange transaction, and
the price mechanism, the actual analytical matrix of
the Wealth of Nations. The classical pursuit of
theories of exchange-value, as we saw, concerns itself
with the alignment of an exchange transaction into an
equalized symmetry in which disequilibrium creates an
excessive remainder. Smith’s price mechanism has as
its goal the sale at the "natural price" which, as the
economics textbooks attest, is the precise value of
bringing the object to market. As Smith's formula
runs: price = rent + wages + profit. The "real" value
is thus worked out outside the immediate exchange
transaction, posing an alternative to the strata of
demands posed by the problems of fair exchange, as
meted out to the labor theory of value. 235 The price-
mechanism defers the locus of the analysis outside the
exchange transaction; and with it the issue of
individual advantage. As such, material gain is now
deferred into the market dynamic. This is the essence
of the Smithean innovation. No errant actual or
235 A detour which, as we noted above, is irrelevant
to Smith's structural innovation. It nonetheless does
gesture, if with little success, to the old issue of
value-in-exchange. Exchange-value, as an analytical
category is to be altogether jettisoned from economic
analysis with the onset of the marginalist revolution.
(However, with regard to the role of the labor theory
of value in Smith, see Louis Dumont's excellent
commentary in From Mandeville to Marx)
.
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theoretical excess can register because "price" now
incorporates "gain" in the form of "profit" —
precisely because it is now structurally incorporated
as the "non-excessive excess" of capital.
The relation between exchange as such and the
price mechanism is marked in the relation between
exchange-value and profit. Equalization in exchange,
as we saw in the essentialized form of the labor theory
of value, can not be maintained when exchange-value in
the form of labor embodied is introduced into the
scheme, which necessarily moves outside of the barter
form. In other words, the labour theory of value
ultimately fails because it can not withstand the
displacement into the representational realm, a
displacement required if it is to assume the form of
exchange-value defined as "labor commanded."
As we also saw in chapter two of the Wealth
,
the
element of reflexivity allotted by the formal process
of the exchange relation is purely one of process or
action. This transitivity of exchange, to the express
exclusion of matter, permits the release of exchange
from the burden of quantitative equalization. A
dematerialized exchange thus serves the most
rudimentary necessities of the constitution of profit.
In this regard, the failure of the quantitative
component, the labour theory of value, is notably
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one
fortuitous. That is to say, the failure of
definition of exchange - as a quantitative value form
— enables the second manifestation of exchange as pure
function
.
The very possibility of profit, therefore,
precisely as a deferral of gain, relies on this initial
(unsuccessful) representational rupture of essential
production/exchange into the value form. In this
sense, profit also functions as the excess of the
inequality of the exchange transaction; although the
gap which causes the original theoretical difficulty is
now, as it were, availed to other ends.
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CHAPTER IV
REVERBERATIONS AND ASSESSMENTS
A. Barter: "Need,” Use and Ambiquit
v
Barter, as we will recall, is cast by Aristotle as
a non-excessive exchange form because it does not rely
upon the mediation of coinage which carries the
potential of transgressive excess. In the barter
transaction, the dissimilitude in outcome is not
regarded by Aristotle as dangerous, but as necessary
and proper, broadly absorbed through the limits
ascribed by need and nature. In the barter
transaction, the socially codified quantitative form
providing mediation is replaced by a purely
distributive function, and as such, is broadly regarded
as not quantitatively calibrated, but nonetheless
mutual. According to Aristotle, although barter is
applicable to pre-political "tribal" associations,
because it is devoid of formal quantitative forms of
measure it is functionally inappropriate to the
acquisitive requirements of political community.
The elements of use and limit associated with
barter are employed by Aristotle to contain the
quantitative expression of exchange, money and
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exchange value, which possess no inherent limit. The
reasoning which directs the employment of use-value in
the Politics is also that which makes chreia so
appealing as a solution to Aristotle's treatment of
exchange in the Ethics. However, as we proposed,
although chreia and use are employed to define and
contain transgressive elements of acquisition, they
themselves harbor a significant ambiguity which, if
subtle, is not ancillary in its implications. As posed
at the conclusion of Part I, Aristotle's analysis in
the Ethics associates chreia with a useful communal
bond. This bond, however, is based not on a precise
restitution, but on the adequate or "sufficient"
(hikanos) accommodation between goods exchanged. The
implications of this, as suggested, are quite
problematical to Aristotle's schema — the natural and
limited category of "need" is not only incongruent with
Aristotle's idea of particular justice as the equal,
but also poses a disturbing question with regard to the
very underpinnings of political association. There
thus exists, in addition to the problems associated
with the quantitative elements of money and exchange-
value, another difficulty. A problem, that is, which
stems from the fact that the most rudimentary elements
of exchange, represented by Aristotle as necessary,
natural and limited, reside outside the domain of
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quantitative social representation. The oblique
inadequacies of purely qualitative or subjective
elements to social representation, as associated with
use or chreia, are, indeed, the very reasons nominal
forms of codification and regulation were initially set
in place in order that the material relations of the
polis could be commonly apprehended and mediated.
The barter form, as an expression of the denial of
"the objectivity of commodity exchange," encloses these
elements by shielding them from collective observation.
As Mar,, has phrased it, barter is an "elementary or
accidental form of the expression of value." 236 It is
this space of arbitrary or "accidental" value which
Aristotle attempts to theorize and clearly demarcate
with the notions of use, need and nature, notions
which, as we said, for Aristotle, contain their own
limit. This sphere related to acquisition, existing
outside social, quantifiable representation, is one in
which not only the concept of chreia, but other related
notions, such as ophelio
, ameinon and sumpheronti
,
are
positioned to instruct and condition. Such notions,
however, inevitably lose their way -- for neither money
236 Marx, Capital, vol. I, pp. 48-49. Also see David
Levine, Economic Theory
,
Volume One: The Elementary
Relations of Economic Life (Boston: Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1977), pp. 111-112.
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nor nature can fully define this realm. Smith,
however, appropriates this "accidental" space quite
differently; by rendering it, one may say, even more
accidental. That this is so may be attributed to
Smith’s complete effacement of the forms which
Aristotle used in attempts to configure or represent
the random elements of this exchange sphere.
Therefore, although for both the Physiocrats and Smith,
wealth is understood to be constituted by tangible
goods. Smith dismisses use-value en toto. It is
dispatched in a few lines at the end of chapter four:
The word VALUE, it is to be observed, has twodifferent meanings, and sometimes expresses the
utiiity of some particular object, and sometimes
the possibility of purchasing other goods which the
possession of that object conveys. The one may be
called 'value in use’; the other, 'value in
exchange.' The things which have the greatest value
in use frequently have little or no value in
exchange; and on the contrary, those which
have the greatest value in exchange have frequently
little or no value in use. 238
Thus, after utilizing all connotation associated with
this notion in chapter two. Smith formally expels the
237 That is, in direct opposition to the mercantilist
emphasis on money as the representative of wealth.
238 "Nothing is more useful than water: but it will
purchase scarce anything; scarce anything can be had in
exchange for it. A diamond on the contrary, has scarce
any value in use; but a very great quantity of other
goods may frequently be had in exchange for it."
( Wealth of Nations, pp. 32-33). See also Cannan's
footnote on p. 33.
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classical content of "use" from his schema by chapter
four." ' The arbitrary or "accidental" elements
harbored with the "beneficial" and mutual relation of
exchange are now more fully exposed. Smith
simultaneously exploits and constitutes the non-
quantitative phenomena, while extirpating the elements
which were used by Aristotle to limit exchange-value.
Here, the conditions of possibility of an
exchangibility not of matter, but of self-interest, may
occur. This is to have a subtle but powerful influence
upon the reconstitution of this "arbitrary" space
existing outside of the realm of quantitative gain.
B. The "Adam Smith Problem"
The ambiguity of the exchange transaction, and the
modern economic turn it assumes in Smith's Wealth of
Nations via the collapse of Aristotle's metaphysical
imperative, necessarily conditions the topography of
Smithean scholarship. This is most patently true for
the longest running and most contentious debate issuing
from the Wealth of Nations.
239 Despite this formal dismissal of use, Smith's
choice of language throughout the remainder of the work
is nonetheless punctuated with analogous words such as
"necessity." Such mention, of course, is always found
mixed with acquisitive opening leading beyond mere
sustenance, such as "conveniency" or "occasion."
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emergence of "das
In the nineteenth-century, the
Adam Smith Probleme" among German scholars inaugurated
a controversy revolving around the relationship between
the presence of self-interest 2- as associated with the
Wealth of Nations and the sympathy and benevolence
found in the Theory of Moral Sentiments
,
241 The
contention over the reconciliation of sympathy and
self-interest in Smith’s work is a fist-to-cuf f s over a
subject which, as placed in the context of the intent
of the Wealth of Nations at large, is relatively puny:
the issue revolves not around the character of "mutual
opulence," but the affect and intent of the transacting
subject. This focus sidesteps Smith’s significant
240 The Wealth of Nations
,
as Max Lerner writes, isfounded on the bedrock" of self-interest.
(Introduction, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes ofthe Wealth of Nations, ed. Edwin Cannan [New York:
Modern Library, 1937], p. ix)
.
And, as Robert H. Frank
remarks, the modern behavioral scientists' focus on
self-interest traces directly back to Adam Smith."{Passions Within Reason [New York: Norton, 1988], p.21). Such an interpretation of the Wealth of Nations
is widely regarded as the basis of the Chicago School,
most notably represented by George Stigler and Milton
Friedman, as well as rational choice theory.
241 For an overview of some of the key issues see
Richard Teichgraeber, "Rethinking the Adam Smith
Problem," Journal of British Studies 20 (Spring 1981).
The most significant attempt to broach the apparent
divergence between the two works is found in A.L
Macfie's The Individual in Society: Papers on Adam
Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967)
.
Jacob
Viner's seminal article, "Adam Smith and Laissez
Faire," ( Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 35 [April
1927], pp. 198-232), is, to the contrary, an enduring
example of the case against a reconciliation between
the two works.
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novation the displacement of gain from the
immediate exchange form, a displacement which opens a
space by which "material" exchange, as now expunged of
the issue of value-in-exchange, may be loaded up with
all manner of qualitative forms. In this sense, Smith
simultaneously creates the conditions for, and the
solution to
, "the Adam Smith Problem." 242
One of the more striking approaches to forging a
"reconciliation" between the mutuality suggested by
benevolence and self-interest is found in the work of
Patricia Werhane. 243 Werhane's goal, as she phrases it,
is to defend the Wealth of Nations against those who
charge it with giving "new dignity to greed and a new
sanctification to the predatory impulse." 244 Werhane
242
That the stakes of the debate assume such a pitchoyer the affective and not on the formally economic
elements of his work are indicative of the
supplantation of the distributive features of Smith'sprice-mechanism by neo-classical economic models.
243
Patricia Werhane, Adam Smith and His Legacy forModern Capitalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1991), p. 92. The text will be referred to hereafter
as ASL. Werhane's argument is a variation of P.L.
Danner s Sympathy and Exchangeable Value: Keys to Adam
Smith's Social Philosophy," Review of Social Economy 34(1976), pp. 317-331, and Robert Boynton Lamb's "Adam
Smith's System: Sympathy, Not Self-Interest" Journal of
the History of Ideas 35 (1974), pp. 671-682.
244
Lerner, Introduction, An Inquiry into the Nature
and Causes of the Wealth of Nations
,
p. ix. George
Stack suggests that the view of predominating self-
interest is the one most commonly held in the Smithean
literature. "Self Interests and Social Value," Journal
of Value Inquiry 18 (1984), pp. 123-137.
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seeks, in turn, to expose elements in the Wealth which
are in accord with the benevolence and sympathy of the
Theory of Moral Sentiments
.
Werhane begins her appraisal with the observation
that in the Wealth of Nations the term ''self-interest"
appears usually in the context of "individual economic
exchanges," and directs our attention to the "single
exchange transaction" portrayed in the butcher-baker
passage in chapter two of the Wealth. 245 This passage
Is of special import, as she tells us, because it is
commonly used in defense of the thesis that "self-
interest ... is the dominant motivating force in the
Wealth of Nations
. According to Werhane, although
self-interests "appear to dominate" in the butcher-
baker passage, cooperation is "both natural and
essential. 1, 24 7 in support of this effort to draw out
elements of "mutual and cooperative" elements in the
Wealth of Nations, Werhane cites, first, the "non-
adversarial" nature of exchange, and by way of
emphasis, directs our attention to the role played by
persuasion in the butcher-baker scenario. Next,
Werhane cites Smith's examples of the distributive
function of commercial exchange — such as relations
245 Werhane, ASL, p. 92.
246 Werhane, ASL, p. 92.
247 Werhane, ASL, p. 94.
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between city and country by which cities provide the
country with finished manufactures and the country
provides the city with raw materials. 248 The result-
"both thus gain from such.
. .mutually advantageous
arrangements
.
" 249
Given the presence of cooperation within the
purportedly self-advantaging exchange transaction, the
"best" definition of self-interest, Werhane concludes,
is that of Lionel Robbins who renders self-interest not
as selfishness, but as "personal interest." Werhane,
after Robbins, describes this "personal interest" as
only the interests of the individual concerned in the
matters with which he is most intimately concerned." 250
This definition gives forceful expression to the
distance between the modern and the classical
understanding of self-advantaging — dangerous
precisely to the extent that it enacts an encroachment
upon another
. As we have seen, this maneuver was
248 Werhane, ASL, p. 94.
249 Werhane, ASL, p. 94.
250 Werhane, ASL, p. 89. Robbins is quoted from his
Political Economy: Past and Present, Vol. 1 (London: G
Routledge & Sons, 1946), p. 180.
251 For this reason, the choice of some modern
translators to use the phrase "self-interest" to
translate pleonexia is less than optimal. For a
succinct example of the modern conception, see for
example, the fourth chapter of Eric Fromm’s Man for
Himself: An Inquiry Into the Psychology of Ethics (New
York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1966)
.
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effected by Smith's transactable self-interested
subject. In Werhane's instance, however, the logic
Which conditions and limits Smith's transacting subject
IS pressed further through the positing of sphere of
autonomy for the self-interested subject. In this
realm of privacy, self-interest, in any conceivable
form, is not so much redefined as sheltered by a zone
which absorbs both motives and ends of self-interest.
As such, the "personal concerns" which make up self-
interest are made to occupy an unassailable bastion, a
neutral sphere preserved from the rigors of
representation. By way of one comparison, the
ostensive goal (and foil) of the transaction in Smith's
account of the encounter between the butcher and the
baker is the procurement of mutton; in Werhane's
account, this tangible object gives way to "concerns"
which are ineffable. (And, if this is not sufficiently
impervious to scrutiny, one may be repelled simply by
the vague prurience of "intimate" concerns.
A primary discrepancy is thus presented. Werhane
asserts the self-interested subject on the one hand, as
a cooperative, exchanging being. Yet, on the other
hand, this self-same subject is presented as occupying
a sovereign sphere. 252 That this sphere of private
252 Werhane's obliviousness to this fundamental
discrepancy in her argument is staggering. The
confusion which ensues from the employment of an
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interest is truly impermeable is indicated by the
inclusion among "personal" concerns not only the
obligatory Smithean categories of "self-betterment" and
"approval-seeking" but Werhane 's highly peculiar catch-
all for the demands, actual or conceptual, of
mtersubjectivity:
"intimate social interests." 253 in
this distention of the notion of privacy, the self-
sufficient autotelic subject coopts its negation and
limit, the "social," within its own inscrutable
confines
.
Given that the point which Werhane sets about to
establish is the essential role of cooperation in the
Wealth, this argument crafts a curious train of events.
At the root of the tension in Werhane' s account between
"cooperation" and an autonomous realm of "intimacy" is
a fundamental deviation from Smith's argument. As we
will recall, early in the discussion Werhane locates
se ^
f
- i nterest in the realm of "appearances" while
positing cooperation as the underlying element of the
transaction: although self-interests do "appear to
dominate" cooperation is "both natural and
autotelic self-interest to organize an argument which
is purportedly based on cooperation produces strange
results. Nonetheless, in one instance we find Werhane
proclaiming that "economic exchanges cannot operate in
the vacuum of self-interest." (Werhane, ASL, p. 89).
253 Werhane, ASL f p. 95. (italics added.)
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essential
.
" 254
I will argue that this
appearance/essence split is central to the significance
of Werhane 's conception of "self-interest."
Werhane
' s impulse (at least in the portion of her
argument that treats the issue of cooperation)
,
tries
to argue from the position that the defense of the
Wealth must consist of drawing these "essential"
elements to the surface. As Werhane ventures: "I will
suggest that it is the desire to cooperate which drives
the impulse to exchange." 255 Smith, as we will recall,
does not assert cooperation as the impulse which drives
exchange. Instead, it is an obtuse "propensity" which
serves as the founding impulse to "truck, barter, and
exchange
.
" 256 This is to say, for Smith, the impulse to
exchange is ultimately founded upon a sub-rational
process.
To attempt, as does Werhane, to draw cooperation
to the level of transactive appearances and
intent ionality, is anathema to the requirements of
Smith's project. At one end of the schema, the
254 Werhane, ASL, p. 94.
255 Werhane, ASL, p. 95.
256 Although arguing that "our natural desire to
cooperate motivates us to barter with other
individuals, " the order of such originary impulses is
elsewhere inverted: "I suggest that it is the natural
interest in trading with others that triggers such
cooperation." (Werhane, ASL, p. 92).
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mtentionless
"propensity" founding the exchange
transaction permits the free-rein of self-interest
("appearances"), to emerge in a two-fold outcome:
materially, as profit, and ideologically as "common
advantage." The outcome of the Smithean process, from
the vantage point of the individual, is that of
Goethe's Mephistopheles, unintended and unforeseen. As
Smith tells us in the famous phrase, the individual is
often deceived, led as it were by an invisible hand"
to contribute toward a greater good. 257
The negation of the centrality of unintended
social outcomes resulting from intentional acts of
self-advantaging to the structure of Smith's argument
is here negated by Werhane, whose effort to reconcile
appearance and essence appears, at this moment,
somewhat Aristotelian. As such, Werhane 's attempt to
reconcile appearance qua self-interest and essence qua
cooperation, may be also phrased as the effort to unify
these two aspects within the single exchange
transaction.
Because Werhane denies both the space of deferral
and subsequently the location of the excessive
remainder, she may be said to be working exclusively
257 See in particular Book III of the Wealth. Compare
also to Part IV, chapter 1 of The Theory of Moral
Sentiments with regard to being "led by an invisible
hand.
"
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from the first portion of the Wealth of Nations.
However, because Werhane's account, unlike Smith's,
does not posit a space for deferral, the sanctimonious
motif leads into a corner: because of the rife
mutuality and cooperation, not only is there no place
for the very intention to profit from another, but
there is no place for individual profit altogether.
Werhane's strict protection of a benign self-interest
creates an untenable argument in which efforts to
construct an autonomous non-encroaching subject
foreclose on the potential for gain en toto. Here, the
classical anxiety associated with exchange has taken a
new, and exceedingly strange, turn.
Werhane's argument, a distillation of the first
portion of the Wealth of Nations
, is a symptom of the
broader naturalization of the ideological origins of
laissez-faire economics. This naturalization evinces
the omission of the quantitative second portion of the
work, the portion where individual gain occurs, as well
as Smith's often acrimonious commentaries with regard
to the capitalist desire for (excessive) profit. It
is, indeed, the very success of Smith's innovation that
permits such naturalization, a naturalization which is,
as suggested, at the root of the "Adam Smith Problem"
-- as well as the source of many of its purported
solutions
.
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Because of this naturalization, a curious paradox
ensues: on one hand, Werhane exists in a post-Smithean
world in which profit and individual gain are already
largely absorbed by a deferral into the market
structure. However, because of the perceived need to
defend Smith or rather, to moralize self-interest
Werhane 's own solution, which both distills and
distorts Smith's position, casts her back to a pre-
Smithean stage of transactive anxiety in which profit
is fugitive and transactivity itself raises a threat. 258
Werhane' s omission of the role of deferral in Smith's
system, as a means to moralize the acquisitive impulses
which drive the market, thus tampers with the
structural positioning of profit as morally neutral.
In the end, the opposition between the autonomous and
morally righteous subject marks the impossibility of an
absolute gain, while the ideological gap — which
Werhane is trying to close -- necessitates it.
258 In a related vein, Werhane' s "defense" of Smith,
arguably, could be protective of a dimly perceived
fissure in the ideological logic, one which would
creates the impulse for a wholesale purging of all
vestiges of the unseemly affect of "self-interest."
134
C. Conclusion
The exchange form poses a problem to theoretical
attempts to represent political community. By tracing
the Aristotelian and early modern genealogy of the
problem and the concomitant attempts at resolution, we
saw that for Aristotle the first approach to the
problem was to attempt an equalization of the exchange
transaction, and the second, to separate the dangerous
and proper forms of exchange. According to Aristotle's
schema, the proper, "beneficial" form is associated
most unambiguously with barter and "use," while the
second, as a potentially adventitious form of pecuniary
gain is associated with exchange-value and the
politico-social necessity of money. However, in the
final instance, Aristotle is unable to maintain a
distinction between a proper or limited form of
exchange and an instance of excess.
impulse to resolve the ambiguity of the money-
mediated exchange transaction by cordoning off the
gainful from the beneficial was given an often
ingenious expression by the mercantilists who defined
mutual and dangerous forms of exchange in terms of the
boundaries of the nation-state: that is, the ambiguity
surrounding exchange was "solved" by ejecting material
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advantage
- profit - from the domestic economy and
into the agonistic international scene. The
physiocrats, in turn, although responsible for laying
the foundation for the theoretical shift from exchange
to production as the source of gain, could not contend
fully with the errant elements of exchange — which in
the final instance were attributed to the guile of the
merchant class.
The Wealth of Nations marks the ideological
resolution of the classical difficulties associated
with exchange and thus the issue of material
distribution in a community — through a
transmogrification of the exchange transaction. The
work at hand has delineated three representations of
exchange in the Wealth of Nations, each of which are
distributive and/or non-quantitative
. First, Smith's
narratives of exchange as spontaneous circulation and
distribution, as found in the account of the division
of labor; second, the infamous butcher-baker mise-en-
scene which omits the possibility of individual
pecuniary gain while shifting exchange onto a meta-
economic level; and third, the use of the barter form
in order to effect the only successful expression of
the labor theory of value. As I have attempted to
show, in the first portion of the Wealth of Nations
these usages perform, under the organizing aegis of
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economic
production, a separation between individual
exchange and quantitative outcome; that is, severing
the very possibility of gain from the individual
"economic sphere" as represented by the single exchange
transaction.
As suggested, the logic associated with the barter
form of exchange serves two purposes: first, as a means
of formal distribution, it offers a non-adventitious
expression of exchange that creates a sphere wherein
the imprecisions endemic to the relation between
exchange-value and quantitative individual gain are
absorbed. Second, the shift from a focus on the
matter transacted to a transactablility of two self-
seeking subjects, creates a pseudo-economic modality of
exchange removed from the thorny issues associated with
quantitative gain. As such, the omission of socially
quantifiable elements permit an ordering of the
machinations associated with the "excessive remainder"
in accord with the matrix of substitution conferred by
the mechanistic notion of exchange. The atavisms of
the barter form which permit this pseudo-economic
reemergence of exchange as pure transactivity marks
both the genealogy and the essence of laissez-faire
economics -- and as such, the ground of neo-liberal
discourse
.
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As has been argued, in the first portion of the
Wealth of Nations
, the omission of quantitative
elements serves to suspend the difficulties associated
with exchange-value and the attendant issues of equal
exchange. As such. Smith’s account in the first
portion of the work forestalls the issue of actual
material advantage until this alternative to single
advantage is introduced, whereby a contained and
legitimized form of individual advantage —
"profit" -
ruptures the mutual abundance created by the division
of labor. Transposing the moment of gain from the
single transaction to a macro level releases the single
transaction from the onus of immediate fairness, while
placing it under the formal aegis of the price
mechanism provides the analytical and structural
supplement for the rhetorical maneuvers of the first
portion of the work.
Within the matrix afforded by production, the new
conception of profit allows a potentially dangerous
pecuniary "surplus" to be contained. When systemically
purified in such a manner, the moment of individual
advantage that was once regarded as dangerous to the
community, becomes an occasion for gain hitherto
absent. This is to say, Smith forges an accommodation
of the paradigms of mutual benefit and individual
advantage that Aristotle, the Mercantilists and the
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Physiocrats struggled to separate. By means of such a
combination of "mutuality" and gain. Smith reascribes
the exchange form in the single version as qualitative
in one sense, and as purely formal in a second. By
thus driving a wedge between quantitative and
qualitative forms. Smith's account may be likewise
apprehended as the economic expression of Hume's
undermining of the classical categories of metaphysics
Smith's innovation presents a solution to the
ambiguity lodged in Aristotle's accounts of exchange;
namely, by redefining the adventitiousness which in
Aristotle's account appeared as a repressed element
existing at the very foundation of the polis. In the
Politics, Aristotle's assessment of the various
exchange forms suggested something quite disturbing:
because the modality of exchange creates a remainder
which can not be theoretically contained nor
organically accounted for, the acquisitive ends of the
citizen could not be fully distinguished from those of
the merchant, who trades expressly for the sake of
gain. Smith's innovation permits the voiding of any
dangers associated with this ambiguity. Instead, now,
as we are told, "every man... becomes in some measure a
merchant
.
" 259
259 Smith, Wealth of Nations, p. 26.
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